

# Trumpism And Emerging Geopolitical Dynamics: Implications on Global Governance

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*Abstract- Donald Trump's re-election as the 47th President of the United States triggered a shift in the international system from a rules-based multilateral order to a fragmented, transactional framework. This shift was occasioned by the implementation/impact of the ideology of 'Trumpism'. This study, therefore, examines the contemporary geopolitics and impact of 'Trumpism', a political ideology rooted in neo-nationalism, protectionism, and 'America First' unilateralism, on the landscape of global governance. By analysing several developments pursued by President Trump, such as the withdrawals from over 66 international organisations, the conflicts in the Middle East, the weaponisation of trade, and the erosion of democratic norms, this study identifies a shift toward a 'multipolar concert' system. The study concludes that while Trumpism disrupts established institutions, it simultaneously catalyses 'soft balancing' and adaptive renewal among middle- and major-power states and regional blocs. Trumpism has propelled global geopolitical dynamics towards 'Selective Multilateralism.' Thus, nations are no longer seeking a single global superpower but are building flexible, 'mini-lateral' coalitions based on specific interests rather than broad ideological alignments. The study therefore recommends establishing resilient institutions with viable funding mechanisms while fostering technical and multilateral alliances in areas where the US has overbearing interests to enhance regional integration and cooperation.*

**Keywords:** *Trumpism, Contemporary Geopolitics, Global Governance and Security, Conflict, Collective Action, Multilateralism, Unilateralism, Mini-lateralism, America First*

## I. INTRODUCTION

The history of humanity has been shaped by leaders whose actions and inactions have dramatically influenced events within their spheres of influence, for better or worse. The outcomes of these leaders' actions or inactions have been evaluated by the people they led as either progressive, regressive, distinguished and/or disgraceful.

While the impact of a leader's actions and inactions may be felt more strongly within their sphere of influence, the overall outcome might reverberate far beyond it. (Goleman, 2011).

Hence, those with the power to lead and govern others must act righteously to justify the legitimacy imposed on them by the governed. It is important to acknowledge that leadership legitimacy is earned, voluntary recognition by followers that a leader has the right to lead, granted through trust, competence, and fairness rather than a formal position alone.

Leadership converts power into influence, drives loyalty and is built on authorisation, enforcement and propriety (Cosans & Reina, 2018). In this regard, national leaders, such as presidents, in contemporary democratic states are elected. National leadership in non-democratic states emerges through other means recognised and respected within their respective sphere of influence.

The United States of America (USA or US) is arguably the most powerful democratic country in the world today, with unparalleled economic, military and technological power; hence, its president is considered one of the most influential. (Congressional Research Service, 2019). The current President of the US is Donald John Trump, who is the 45th and 47th President of the country.

He was inaugurated as the 47th President of the US on 20 January 2025 (White House, 2026). The term "Trumpism" is associated with Donald Trump (Sopel, 2018). Trumpism is a multifaceted political movement and ideology that emerged during Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign.

It represents a significant shift from traditional 'Reagan-era' conservatism, focusing on a 'common

sense' brand of populism, nationalism, and anti-establishment sentiments. These sentiments encompass President Trump's definition of the 'America First' Nationalism, or his desire to 'Make America Great Again' (MAGA), economic protectionism, 'nativism and immigration restriction', and right-wing populism (Sopel, 2018). These sentiments continue to shape President Donald Trump's actions and inactions, even in his second term.

Following the end of the Cold War, global governance has been anchored in US-led institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the World Bank (Myerson, 2016; Foot, Macfarlane, & Mastanduno, 2003).

However, over the last 18 months of President Trump's second tenure, the world has witnessed an unprecedented infusion of Trumpism, with grave, unimaginable, and compelling impact on global governance and geopolitics. The emergence of Trumpism as a dominant geopolitical force has replaced the 'liberal international order' with a 'transactional order.' Presently, the world is witnessing a fundamental shift from a rules-based order to one orchestrated by Trumpism, with the US transforming from the primary guarantor of global stability to its chief disruptor (Cosans & Reina, 2018).

The MAGA and America First ideologies now prioritise the US interpretations and dealings with other nations. Hence, Trumpism prioritises national sovereignty and bilateral leverage while neglecting the growing need for collective action to manage global risks such as climate change, AI regulation, and economic stability (Ugbo, 2026).

This study examines the resulting geopolitical friction and its long-term implications for the international community. The central problem is the institutional vacuum created by US disengagement, a consequence of adopting Trumpism's ideals.

For example, the withdrawal of funding and membership from critical entities such as the WHO, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and over 66 international organisations

implies that the Trump administration has paralysed global responses to transnational threats, including climate change, pandemics, and economic instability (Fattorini, 2025; Markou-Pappas, Fugazzola, & Ansaloni, 2026).

This retreat would ultimately embolden revisionist powers and non-state actors (NSAs) to expand their spheres of influence, leading to a breakdown of international norms on territorial integrity and human rights. Thus, this study will evaluate the transformative effects of Trumpism on global governance and propose strategic responses for international stability.

In this regard, the study will analyse the overall impact of Trumpism on global security and governance with a view to proffering the way forward based on emerging geopolitical dynamics. The methodology for the study follows a qualitative, multi-disciplinary research design, as the discussion involves real-time, contemporary political shifts and prioritises empirical discourse analysis and scenario forecasting over static historical data.

## II . UNDERSTANDING TRUMPISM

Since 2016, Trumpism, the ideology associated with President Trump, has often been used in close conjunction with the MAGA and America First political movements. It comprises ideologies such as right-wing populism, right-wing anti-globalism, national conservatism and neo-nationalism, and features significant illiberal and authoritarian tendencies.

'Trumpians', 'Trumpists', 'Trumpettes' and 'Trumpeters' are terms for individuals who exhibit Trumpist characteristics and/or support the ideologies of Trumpism (Baptist & Clark, 2024; Sopel, 2018). The primary driving force behind Trumpism is the America First philosophy, which first gained traction during President Woodrow Wilson's 1916 campaign to keep the US neutral in World War I.

The more non-interventionist approach gained prominence before World War II in 1939, and there was even a pressure group, the America First Committee, during the war (Oglesby, 2020;

Churchwell, 2018). President Donald Trump only re-echoed and reignited the ideology during his 2016 campaign. Trumpism has defined President Trump's policies, which emphasised the US's withdrawal from international treaties and organisations, reshaping global governance and geopolitical dynamics.

The defining characteristics of Trumpism include an authoritarian leadership style that casts President Trump as a strongman capable of challenging established institutional norms. It focuses on personal loyalty to the leader. Indeed, President Trump emphasised that nothing can stop him from achieving and carrying out whatever he wishes when he stated, 'Yeah, there is one thing. My own morality.

My own mind, it's the only thing that can stop me.' Therefore, Trumpism is anchored in what the president believes at any given moment, on any given day, about any given subject (Sopel, 2018). Hence, Trumpism elevates whatever President Trump thinks or believes on any issue, irrespective of the fact, as correct.

This attitude has had tremendous effects and grave implications for US extant laws, policies and viewpoints on global geopolitics, with serious consequences for international best practices and statutory regulations in the US and other jurisdictions. Indeed, President Trump has labelled any media outlet that opposes or criticises him as biased and fake; this has led to his being sanctioned by several social media outlets.

As a result, President Trump established his own social media platform, which he called TruthSocial. President Trump, like most emperors in recorded history, considers himself always right, even when he has become consistently inconsistent.

The rhetoric of Trumpism is transgressive in nature and uses nicknames, mockery and a high volume of controversial statements to dominate the news media. The transactional realism of Trumpism views alliances through the prism of US profits and investment returns rather than strategic stability or global security.

The ideals promoted by Trumpism are averse to globalisation, climate change prevention, collective action mechanisms and ideas not beneficial to the US. Indeed, Pope Leo XIV aptly summarised the combined effects of Trumpism and other geopolitical dynamics of this era on global governance during his 2026 Ash Wednesday Homily.

He stated that '...the weight of a world that is ablaze, of entire cities destroyed by war.... is also reflected in the ashes of international law and justice among peoples, the ashes of entire ecosystems and harmony among peoples, the ashes of critical thinking and ancient local wisdom, the ashes of that sense of the sacred that dwells in every creature' (Tornielli, 2026).

### III EFFECTS OF TRUMPISM ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND GEOPOLITICS

#### 3.1 The Collapse of Multilateralism

The US withdrawal from 66 international organisations on 7 January 2026 represents a significant disservice to multilateralism and globalisation. The US decision affects 31 UN organisations and 35 other international organisations and agencies. In 2025, the US initiated its withdrawal from the WHO and concluded on 22 January 2026 (Amnesty International, 2026).

These withdrawals have created geopolitical shifts in global dynamics, since the US accounts for major financial and strategic directions in the organisations. Specifically, the US withdrawal from the WHO has potential consequences for global health management. In withdrawing, the US asserts that these organisations do not represent the country's interests and aims to reduce funding for bodies it considers ineffective or that interfere with US interests (Abakorma, 2025).

In addition to withdrawing from these organisations, President Trump systematically cut funding for USAID in 2025, jeopardising more than 83 per cent of the agency's activities. In addition, the US exit from the Paris Peace Accords has left a leadership void in climate change governance and advocacy (Gorbacheva, Nikolai, & Siarhei, 2024).

The wider implication is that these agencies/organisations would either fold up, be financially constrained, or source funding from donors other than the US to remain relevant and conduct their activities effectively.

### 3.2 Trade Weaponisation and Geoeconomics

Trumpism preaches America First, and President Trump has weaponised trade by imposing unprecedented tariffs on goods and services sold to the US. Thus, countries and businesses are facing various tariffs imposed by President Trump, making global trade a competitive and dangerous zero-sum game that would ultimately harm humanity.

It is assessed that President Trump's implementation of the 'Liberation Day' tariffs across several goods and services from countries worldwide contravenes the WTO adjudication (Souza et al, 2025). These contraventions would gravely affect global production of goods and services due to supply chain fragmentation, with countries moving toward more trade-friendly nations and, when possible, striving for complete self-sufficiency to avert US tariffs.

The weaponisation of trade has also led to a situation in which global leaders are forced to offer US officials and executives incentives to undertake high-value bilateral purchases and sales to avoid sudden tariff hikes, replacing stable trade laws with personalist negotiations. Trumpism has made world trade toxic, becoming subject to the whims and caprices of President Trump's narcissism.

Because of the US's technological, economic, and military might, President Trump's weaponisation of trade, and his belief that everything must be in the US's interest, nations are seeking more favourable alternatives. This has the potential to galvanise shifts in trade and elicit developments that would minimise the economic impacts on global governance. Thus, new alliances are emerging to redefine geopolitical dynamics and reduce the influence of US hegemony.

### 3.3 Hemispheric Realism in Geopolitics

The transactional nature of Trumpism has instigated several shifts in global geopolitics. This has led to a return to 'Great Power Politics'. The rhetoric of President Trump and his desire for territorial

expansion, including his reference to Canada as the 51st state of the US and his call to annex Greenland, threaten world peace and security (Alemanno, 2026).

The interventions of the US in Venezuela and its invasion through a military operation codenamed Operation Absolute Resolve have combined to weaken the post-World War II norm against territorial conquest (Goettlich, 2025).

Operation Absolute Resolve led to the arrest and removal of the constitutionally elected president of Venezuela and the commandeering of the country's oil resources and assets to reimburse military costs. Resource-based security and reimbursement diplomacy pose serious threats to global peace and security.

The abduction of President Maduro of Venezuela on 3 January 2026 for trial in the US negates known laws and conventions on sovereign rights of countries (Longobardo, 2026). These incidents fit into the MAGA narratives and are potentially troubling for other nations because of their implications for established international immunity norms. These developments also set a bad example for powerful nations, encouraging them to interfere in the internal affairs of weaker countries unilaterally or to enforce laws outside their jurisdiction.

The quest for territorial gains further deepens the threats posed by Trumpism to global peace and security. Regarding threats to Greenland's status and NATO countries' reactions, there could be a gradual rebalancing of global security alliances. Thus, President Trump's pursuit of territorial gains must be curbed to ensure the security of Europe and other parts of the world.

It is assessed that US actions in Venezuela, Greenland, and other parts of the world could prompt other powerful nations to interfere with or undermine the sovereignty of smaller or weaker countries. Additionally, President Trump's disregard for international norms and institutions, through his actions and inactions, is concerning and could seriously endanger global governance, peace, and security.

### 3.4 Promotion of Governance As a Subscription Service

The transactional nature of Trumpism aligns with the perception that the US will intervene in any global conflict or activity only if there is something to gain. This resonates very well with the MAGA philosophy and has led to the establishment of the Board of Peace (BoP) to midwife Gaza's rebuilding.

This marks a fundamental departure from the UN model for conflict resolution. The BoP introduces a subscription-based approach in which members must provide a \$1 billion buy-in for permanent influence on the Board (Lokanan, 2026). This has effectively created a plutocratic multilateralism. As expected under the philosophy of Trumpism, the BoP's executive power is centralised and concentrated in President Trump, who is the life chair of the Board (Steel, 2025).

Thus, traditional diplomatic consensus is bypassed in favour of a corporate-style 'Board of Directors' approach. President Trump's desire to extend the Gaza template BoP to other parts of the world as a model for resolving intractable conflicts would significantly obstruct global governance and the pursuit of global peace and security as currently practised. This emphasises the Trumpian model of using economic and military might as decisive factors in global geopolitics, undermining the application of mechanisms for the common good and sustainability.

It is interesting to observe that by appointing himself as the long-term head of the BoP, President Trump has personalised global diplomacy. Governance is no longer about the 'office' of the US President but about the individual persona, signalling a move from institutionalism to the 'Strongman' philosophy. The \$1 billion financial commitment requirement for nations seeking permanent status in the BoP, as included in its statute, reduces peacebuilding and peacekeeping to transactional activities and global governance to plutocracy (Sun & Yu, 2025).

The model is believed to have been included in the adopted memorandum signed to resolve the US-Iran conflict – the Islamabad Memorandum - although details remain sketchy (Iran International, 2026). This approach has transformed global governance in

a manner suggestive that influence is explicitly purchased rather than earned through normative alignment or historical standing. The significant import of the BoP arrangement lies in its shift in global governance.

The UN is no longer at the centre of the world order; it has become one of many competing arenas. Again, the US cutback in funding, coupled with its exit from 31 UN agencies, the implication is that the organisation will henceforth struggle to remain a relevant mediator, as the US has been its main financier.

Thus, Trumpism has effectively catalysed a de-globalisation of the UN, forcing the organisation to survive with less money, less American leadership, and a new, more fragmented identity, which could inevitably render it ineffective and complacent in upholding global peace and security.

### 3.5 Immigration and Racial Discrimination

The philosophy of MAGA seeks to promote the right-wing and white supremacist ideology. Many Americans, who support the ideology of Trumpism, are favourably disposed to the narrative that migrants are responsible for most of the socioeconomic problems bedeviling the US (Arbona, 2025).

Trumpism led the US to deny visas to the award-winning Somali referee, Omar Abdulkadir Artan, and the Palestinian Football Association president, Jibril Rajoub, to participate in the 2026 World Cup. Similarly, the US denied the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and 80 other Palestinian officials visas to attend the UN General Assembly in 2025 under the pretext of national security, thereby undermining the UN status of extraterritoriality in respect of New York meetings.

These occurrences align with President Trump's quest to restrict the entry of persons from several countries into the US. Trumpism is also behind the renewed travel and visa restrictions imposed on several countries worldwide. Allegedly, the Trump administration also promotes religious and racial discrimination, especially against non-white people and those not of the Christian faith.

Indeed, President Trump noted in the 2026 State of the Union address that ‘I’m very proud to say that during my time in office, both the first four years, and particularly the last year, there has been a tremendous renewal in religion, faith, Christianity, and belief in God’ (BBC, 2026).

This kind of rhetoric from President Trump undermines the US status as a secular, free and democratic society that respects all people regardless of faith, race, sex and other statuses, and is unfortunate and discriminatory. Trumpism has led several countries and individuals to directly and indirectly express their dislike for the US, and this has created some unforeseen and somewhat open aggressions against the government and people of the US.

### 3.6 Renewed Race for Power and Influence

The raw display of might to enforce the US's will, embodied by President Trump, has prompted other sovereign states to enhance their economic, military, and technological capabilities by any means possible. This has sparked a renewed quest for power and influence through the acquisition of technology, military power, and economic prosperity.

The craze for might through military acquisition, economic prosperity, and technology has brought about an unhealthy rivalry. The danger of this race could be detrimental to global peace, security, and stability. Trumpism and the MAGA agendas have made the US utilise their advantages in technology, economy and military to enhance national security assets for the greatness of the US.

In line with MAGA, the US has adopted a policy requiring all high-end AI chips to be routed through its verification process. This has created a digital control system that forces every nation to choose between the US and China across hardware and acquisition stacks (Tsymbalista & Katernyak, 2025).

It is also noted that the quest for control over rare earth minerals and other resources drives some US decisions in global conflict resolution. Again, countries are intensifying the quest to improve their military might, fuelling an arms race, especially in the acquisition of nuclear power. It is believed that

acquiring nuclear weapons would guarantee a nation from being bullied or undermined by the US; the cases of North Korea, India and Pakistan readily come to mind. Thus, regional powers without nuclear weapons are reconsidering whether to acquire them as a deterrent against bullying by the US and other nuclear powers (Sisson, 2024).

## IV GLOBAL RESPONSE TO TRUMPISM AND IMPACTS

### 4.1 The United Nations

The most immediate impact of the MAGA and America First policies of the Trump administration is a severe liquidity crisis in the UN. The US has traditionally provided roughly 22% of the UN's regular budget and 25% of its peacekeeping costs (Leppert, 2025). As of January 2026, the Trump administration stopped funding 31 UN entities deemed to be averse to US interests.

As a result of this action, several UN organisations, including the WHO, UNRWA, and the UN Human Rights Council, have had their US contributions zeroed out. As of February 2026, the US had yet to pay its financial obligation to the UN, which accounts for over 95% of the total amount owed by member states for the year (UN, 2026). This has forced the UN Secretariat to announce plans to shed 20% of its staff to stay afloat (AP News, 2025).

Such massive cuts to agencies that provide humanitarian and health services worldwide would have huge consequences for humanity and global well-being. Indeed, some experts have concluded that a major aid recession is underway, with millions in the Global South losing access to life-saving assistance.

However, others assert that there would be some form of global aid rebalancing and restructuring, since nature abhors a vacuum (Leppert, 2025; Annan, Case, & Labeille, 2025; Sisson, 2024). Hence, there would be other nations, corporations, and individuals with the necessary financial means to provide funding and avert catastrophic consequences for humanity.

Actions undertaken under the Trumpist philosophy would substantially affect the exercise of US soft power, as the UN has historically served as a platform for it. Under Trumpism, that power is being intentionally withdrawn or redirected to several other initiatives undertaken by the Trump administration.

It is noted that the US now uses its UN Security Council veto not just for policy but as a bargaining chip for President Trump to further its MAGA mantra and pursue bilateral deals outside the UN chamber. The actions of the US seem to explicitly reject the UN push for a universal human rights model and support a realist model in which the UN's role would be to facilitate coordination among sovereign states rather than to set global standards.

Because the UN is increasingly paralysed by the US-China-Russia gridlock, and through the unpalatable and brazen use of their veto power for selfish purposes, global governance is gradually becoming 'mini-lateral'. Thus, instead of universal treaties, countries are forming minilateral groups, such as the 'Green Trade Pact' or 'AI Safety Clubs', that include only like-minded nations. Regional spheres of influence are gradually replacing the Global Commons approach.

Nations with sufficient resources and influence now seek regional hegemony to advance their interests and project 'power and might' across their spheres of influence. For instance, the US focus has shifted toward the Western Hemisphere, as evidenced by its 2026 actions regarding Venezuela and threats toward Canada, Greenland, and Mexico (Lokanan, 2026).

In Eurasia, Russia, the EU and NATO, Turkey, and China are asserting their influence over security and other affairs. There are also alternative poles emerging, such as BRICS+, which have positioned themselves as stabilisers of the multilateral order, even as they build alternative financial and technological systems, such as the New Development Bank (NDB, 2026).

Trumpism has also led to the US effectively ceding ground in Central Asia and parts of Africa to China and Russia. It is noted that Trumpism has popularised a realist view of sovereignty that dismisses universal

human rights or environmental standards as 'globalist interference', which are not in line with the MAGA agenda. This has emboldened other nations to prioritise domestic control over international law.

The UN surreptitiously endorsed the establishment of the BoP through Resolution 2803 (BoP, 2025). Critics see the US hoodwinking of UN Security Council members into approving the BoP as a tacit betrayal of the UN, since it was intended as a temporary tool for Gaza stabilisation (UN, 2025).

However, the US has transformed it into a permanent, Trump-led association to influence and rival the UN in global geopolitics and governance. Trump's BoP has evolved into a global template for conflict resolution, as it is considered a possible model for resolving the Ukraine-Russia war and other conflicts worldwide (Sun & Yu, 2025). This would significantly alter the world's security and geopolitical landscape.

The BoP's funding formula seriously hinders UN member states' ability to sustain funding, as President Trump appears to have bullied world leaders to cough up one billion US dollars for BoP membership rights. The implication is that the leaders would prefer to invest their state resources in the BoP for guaranteed US protection rather than fulfil their civic duty to pay the UN subscription, without any apparent advantage.

The UN complex subscription format, which grants unparalleled privilege to its veto members, discourages some members who have called for reforms, unlike the BoP, which operates on a flat fee for an all-access pass (Sun & Yu, 2025). The exclusivity of the BoP is attractive to countries that can afford it because of its unique advantages: rapid, high-impact infrastructure and security projects, clear guarantees of stability and peace, and US support (Lokanan, 2026).

The unique assurances of the BoP would rapidly accelerate the UN's decline into irrelevance, turning it into a ceremonial body for poor countries. At the same time, the BoP becomes an exclusive plutocratic club that makes decisions for global governance.

#### 4.2 China

China watches with interest the changes that President Trump's policies are bringing to global governance and geopolitics. Of particular interest to China would be the US's continued imposition of tariffs on various goods and services. These changes would affect China's productive economy and its relationships with several other trading partners (Souza et al, 2025).

This would mean that China must expand its market presence abroad and intensify development in technology, industry, commerce, and defence to maintain a favourable position in the emerging geopolitical landscape. Thus, China has continued to assert its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ASEAN and BRICS+ organisations (US Global Leadership Coalition, 2025).

The US pullback from the UN and other multinational organisations perceived as unfavourable to US interests offers China an opportunity to attain global leadership within them. China has moved aggressively to fill technical and administrative leadership roles within the UN by tactically embedding its BRI priorities into UN development frameworks (Institute of World Economics and Politics, 2023).

China has embraced UN-centric defence mechanisms to enhance the global appeal of its methods and approaches in international politics (US Global Leadership Coalition, 2025). Trumpism has enabled China to step into the vacuum created by the US, systematically reengineering the UN's workings to align with its beliefs about respect for sovereignty.

China's focus capitalises on its role as the conservative defender of the status quo, of respect for international law, including the provisions of the UN Charter. China has also taken steps to fill the funding and leadership gaps left by the US in the UN and other international agencies and organisations, while emphasising the need to respect states and to promote global peace and security (Sun & Yu, 2025).

Thus, China is unapologetic in condemning the unilateral actions and aspirations of the US in Venezuela, Canada and Greenland, including US

actions in the Middle East, especially in the Israeli-Hamas War. These ideals are anchored in respect for national sovereignty and rights while promoting global ideological reengineering towards 'multilateralism with Chinese characteristics' (Sun & Yu, 2025).

China has also adopted a different approach to asserting its influence globally, avoiding the universal policing model implemented by the US in favour of less provocative and less expensive forms of technical and development assistance. Smartly, China has integrated its BRI with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), thereby giving Chinese state-owned enterprises a 'UN-approved' veneer (Mensah & Yankson, 2025).

The key leadership role China plays in the global multilateral space and the renewed calls for UN reforms after almost 80 years of existence provide China with an opportunity to subtly champion its agenda of 'democratic concept with Chinese characteristics' (Sun & Yu, 2025).

The concept of democracy with Chinese characteristics contains traces of authoritarianism and could weaken gains achieved within the global human rights cycle if adopted. The UN and other development partners must remember that in 2025, China led a coalition to redefine 'human rights' to include 'the right to development and national stability' (Xinhua, 2025).

This effectively shields states from UN scrutiny regarding domestic crackdowns. While China continues to oppose unilateral US interventions, based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, it is curious that China encourages the UN to delegate more power to regional blocs such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS+, where it holds dominant sway (He, 2020).

These reforms and agitations effectively bypass the US-led UN Security Council consensus. This approach would promote China's leadership and ensure its subtle application of soft power to shape the future global rules. Already, China has secured leadership or significant influence in bodies such as

the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), enabling it to set global standards for 6G, AI ethics, and data surveillance (Xinhua, 2025). These reforms would inevitably empower China to expand its sphere of influence without the toga of a global watchdog.

The US actions in Venezuela and its pursuit of Greenland have effectively bifurcated the BRI, undermining its status as a global monolith by excluding the Western Hemisphere. Thus, China's inaction could signal subtle acceptance of the new status quo. The implication could be more troubling than it appears, as China could be negotiating for greater influence in East Asia, the South China Sea, and other regions where it believes the US would have difficulty exerting control.

Thus, the US dominance of the Americas could serve as a stimulant or a strategic blueprint for China to pursue its geopolitical sovereign objectives of politically controlling Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. This could be justified by what China has termed the US's hypocritical support for and defence of Israel's bizarre oppressions in the Middle East (Souza et al, 2025).

Again, the US actions in Venezuela could provide a veritable recipe and moral defence for the Chinese desire to actualise its historical claims to Taiwan as one of its provinces. China is systematically using the Venezuela intervention to build a normative shield. It is assessed that the US Operation Absolute Resolve provides sufficient leverage for other powers to conduct similar operations to achieve immediate strategic security objectives swiftly.

China could therefore conduct a similar operation to displace the leadership in Taiwan, but unlike the US, the Chinese would establish permanent governance and militarily occupy the territory.

The combined effects of hemispheric hegemony and Trumpism facilitated the BoP, unilateral actions in Venezuela and Greenland, and trade tariffs could give China and other ambitious nations with the right willpower the impetus and, as 'Proof of Concept', for a world where the UN is a ceremonial relic.

If the BoP successfully stabilises Gaza through sheer economic and military force, it will provide a template for resolving other intractable conflicts, such as those in the Donbas, the Balkans, the South China Sea, the Middle East, Taiwan, and across Africa.

This template would demonstrate the UN's ineffectiveness and encourage contending parties to bypass the 20th-century legal order entirely, seeking workable solutions to achieve a quick resolution, including measures against weak states. Thus, China may quickly take over Taiwan and oppose other nations within the South China Sea to explore the resources and gain undue territorial advantages.

These actions or scenarios are justifiable, given the apparent acceptance of US actions in Venezuela, as they align with the US's plea of territorial security concerns to justify kinetic actions and the need for hemispheric security guarantees as an exception for unilateral actions.

#### 4.3 The European Union

Europe faces the possibility of being divided based on individual countries' ideological beliefs and inability to effectively stand up to President Trump's unilateralism under the guise of MAGA and America First.

Trumpism is also threatening the unity of NATO, especially EU countries and could ultimately undermine the security of Europe. Although EU nations were unable to openly criticise US actions in the Americas and Venezuela, some have been bold enough to voice opposition to US support for Israel in the Gaza War and to actions towards trade, Canada, Greenland, and Ukraine (Lippert & Mair, 2026).

Collectively, the EU response to the BoP was a refusal to join, citing observed lapses and fundamental incompatibility with democratic governance. The EU views the designation of Donald Trump as the 'Chairman for Life' with sole veto power as inconsistent with global governance standards. Indeed, France and Germany have been the most vocal opponents, with French President Macron calling the BoP an 'extra-legal usurpation' of the UN Security Council (RFI, 2026).

The EU's official position is that any Gaza transition must remain strictly under the mandate of UN Resolution 2803, not a private board. EU leaders noted that the requirement for the BoP permanent members to pay \$1 billion into a fund was akin to a pay-and-play arrangement (Lippert & Mair, 2026).

Thus, EU members were requested to direct such huge payouts toward stabilising the UN's liquidity crisis. Notwithstanding EU concerns about the BoP, some members (Hungary, Bulgaria) have joined to secure US favour, while others have agreed to provide humanitarian assistance to Gaza.

Trumpism has led the EU to adopt increasingly desperate survival strategies following the initial shocks caused by some of President Trump's actions in 2025. Increasingly, the EU is leaning towards achieving some form of strategic autonomy and economic defence. The crises of distrust, bullying, and disrespect for sovereignty escalated in January 2026 following the 'Greenland Crisis,' in which President Trump threatened 25% tariffs on several EU nations to force a sale of the territory (Lippert & Mair, 2026).

France, Germany and some economically powerful members have openly opposed the US and are contemplating building parallel European security frameworks to avoid total subordination to Trump's transactional whims (Bond, 2025). Accordingly, the EU, for the first time, seriously threatened to trigger the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) (Bamberger, 2026).

This provision allows the EU Commission to impose retaliatory tariffs and block public procurement without requiring the unanimous approval of member states. Therefore, as of January 2026, the threat of \$93 billion in retaliatory tariffs was credited with forcing a temporary US climbdown on the Greenland-linked duties.

However, despite the EU's tough talk, a massive trade framework was signed in July 2025 to avoid a baseline 30% tariff, and the EU agreed to purchase \$750 billion in US energy and \$600 billion in US investments over three years (Bamberger, 2026). These deals show that the EU would ultimately

continue to rely on the US for its energy and economic survival.

The impacts of Trump's policies and his rhetoric towards the Russia-Ukraine war have provided a renewed awakening in terms of security and defence of Europe for the EU countries. In response to these realities and the immense pressure from President Trump, the EU's defence spending has surged (Brooksby et al., 2025).

The 'European Pillar' of NATO is becoming a reality, with Germany and other EU-like-minded nations proposing a unified European defence industry to reduce reliance on US-made hardware (Bamberger, 2026). In addition, the EU is fast-tracking a viable security pact with the UK to hedge against US isolationism.

This pact includes joint training, intelligence sharing, and potentially troop deployment for enhanced fencing in Eastern Europe if the US withdraws from the Ukraine conflict. In an unprecedented move, the US's traditional allies refused to align with it in the Iranian conflict (Rahimi, 2026; Bakhteyar, 2026).

The MAGA policy of the Trump administration has radically shifted the burden of the war onto European taxpayers and has emphasised that the US will no longer fund military aid. Instead, the Europeans must pay the US directly for the defence of their land. This makes EU and NATO countries customers of the US defence industry (Bakhteyar, 2026).

The EU's plan to use the €210 billion in frozen Russian assets to fund the war in Ukraine was opposed by the US, which favoured post-war reconstruction as part of a deal with Moscow. These concerns, along with the highly unpredictable temperament of US leadership, continue to adversely affect Europe's security and other aspects of global governance and geopolitics.

#### 4.4 United Kingdom

The transactional aspect of Trumpism has been evident in the US-UK relationship, particularly in the trade-off between defence and agricultural products. One of the biggest challenges before June 2026, in line with President Trump's modus operandi, was his

relentless pressure on the UK to lower agricultural standards for US imports, which could undermine the UK's drive to align with its EU neighbours (The White House, 2025).

In response to President Trump's unprecedented global tariffs, the UK sealed a trade deal with the US at an unfavourable cost, including caving to US demands on pharmaceutical pricing that could significantly increase NHS costs (UK Govt, 2025; The White House, 2025).

These compromises present the UK as weak and may ultimately lead to internal crises. In terms of security, the UK continues to partner with the US but has opposed Trump's interest in Greenland, Iran, Israel and other parts of the Middle East (Bassou, 2026).

Thus, the UK has deepened its partnership with the EU on European security while declaring Arctic security a priority to coordinate its efforts with Nordic allies and prevent a geopolitical vacuum in the North. The UK also declined the US request to be drawn into its conflict with Iran.

Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair's membership of the Executive Board in the BoP architecture puts the UK in a more awkward position. While the UK government has failed to embrace the BoP to maintain its EU security reset, it has stopped short of full condemnation to avoid jeopardising its fragile trade agreements with the US.

The UK has therefore joined France in refusing to sign the BoP charter, emphasising that the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) in Gaza must be an UN-authorized body. However, the UK seeks to protect its interests in the Middle East without further compromising its sovereign rights and independence (Bassou, 2026).

A sore point for the UK in the BoP charter is the contentious immunity offered to members, some of whom have been indicted internationally. However, the BoP explicitly bypasses the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Bamberger, 2026), thus rendering international governance mechanisms and legal jurisprudence ineffective.

#### 4.5 Russia

Russia's response to Trumpism can be summarised as a blend of opportunistic engagement and strategic scepticism. Russia is capitalising on the US-led disruption of geopolitical and global governance as an opportunity to re-legitimise its own power, while remaining wary of the unpredictable, transactional nature of the US 'spheres of influence' model.

Russia has used the current US BoP arrangement as a gambit to push for the unfreezing of monies seized by US allies to pay the \$1 billion permanent membership fee (Horst, 2023). This offer to use 'stolen' (frozen) money for the humanitarian reconstruction of Gaza is seen as an attempt by Russia to force President Trump to either push for the release of the funds or forgo Russia's participation in the BoP.

Thus, Russia sees the BoP as a pathway out of the diplomatic isolation imposed since 2022, because it could signal the end of its isolation, even as the war in Ukraine remains unresolved (Teslova, 2026). Russia's abstention from the passage of UN Resolution 2803, because it contravened the UN Charter, permitted ISF deployment in Gaza. However, Russia considered the ISF to be a US experiment designed to bypass the UN Security Council's standard statutory controls (Nebenzia, 2026).

Thus, as an alternative, Russia seeks to introduce its own resolution that would place the ISF under strict UN control rather than what the Trump-controlled BoP proposes. Though it failed, it allowed Russia to position itself as the 'defender' of the UN Charter against American unilateralism. Notwithstanding Russia's agreement to participate in the BoP, it affirmed in February 2026 that its strategic partnership with China is unshakeable (Nebenzia, 2026; Teslova, 2026).

Several pieces of literature suggest that Russia prefers a tripolar world, in which the US, Russia, and China maintain their 'spheres of influence' in line with Trump's model (Nebenzia, 2026; Horst, 2023; Bassou, 2026). This model aligns with Russia's long-term goal of a Eurasian Security Architecture, in which the US retreats from Eastern Europe in

exchange for Russian cooperation in theatres in the Middle East or the Arctic (Nebenzia, 2026).

The issues in Greenland and Venezuela are also of concern to Russia. Russia has indicated that any US move into Greenland, as it did in Venezuela, could imply a redrawing of global maps, especially in the Atlantic. Hence, the US could be playing into the Russians' hands by pushing to assert its authority and territorial claims in Eurasia.

These occurrences could become concerning and provide a basis for Russia in its diplomatic efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war. This is especially so as the US tries to force a peaceful, agreeable transition from war. The US shift from being Ukraine's primary financier to being its primary mediator and now to pushing for a June 2026 deadline for a final territorial settlement fits the Russian narrative but puts pressure on Ukraine.

Following the high-profile Anchorage Summit in August 2025, US-Russia relations entered a new transactional phase, with President Trump issuing a formal ultimatum to the warring parties to reach a deal. A 'carrot and stick' approach whereby Ukraine is threatened with a total cut-off of aid, while Russia gets a massive new sanctions package if it refuses to end hostilities, has been implemented.

Now, with financial pressure on the EU, the UK, and Ukraine, an acceptable settlement for all parties may be in sight. President Trump's actions in late 2025 and early 2026 have reinforced Russia's position for territorial gains, and Russia has employed its 'Oreshnik' intermediate-range missile in Western Ukraine to send a clear message to the West that any European peacekeeping force entering Ukraine would be met with strategic, potentially nuclear-capable, strikes.

Russia's uncompromising stances of total withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the four annexed oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia) and a constitutional ban on Ukraine joining NATO are considered flexing of the muscles following some of Trump's actions and inactions.

#### 4.6 Middle East

One region of the world where Trumpism has had a significant impact, with diverse responses from key players, is the Middle East. This region has been described as the primary testing ground for Trump's 'dealmaker' diplomacy (Badawi, 2025).

Responses from the region are split between enthusiastic adoption by Gulf monarchies and defensive resistance from Iran, while the Levant remains a zone of high-stakes experimentation. The monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE have become the willing anchors of Trumpism in the region, and they see Trump's transactional style of leadership as more predictable and accommodating of their abuses of human rights and democratic values.

Accordingly, the UAE has fully embraced Trump's BoP, with President Mohammed bin Zayed joining as a founding member. The UAE hopes that its support for the US would enable access to US advanced microchip technology for AI development and maritime security guarantees, while maintaining its lucrative trade ties with China (Bin Huwaidin, 2024).

In the same vein, Saudi Arabia considers its support for the US BoP a profitable 'Price for Peace' and is leveraging it to expand the Abraham Accords and serve as an ultimate bargaining chip. Notwithstanding Arab nations' objections, Saudi Arabia is also considering normalising formal relations with Israel to facilitate a defence treaty with the US and ensure pathways to Palestinian statehood.

Both countries (UAE and Saudi Arabia), including Qatar, have also committed nearly \$2 trillion in US investments over the next decade (Fox News, 2025; White House, 2025).

Trumpism has dealt a decisive blow to the political, socio-economic and cultural survival of Iran. Since Trump's inauguration in 2025, key Iranian leaders, scientists and infrastructure have been killed and decimated (The Conversation, 2026).

Iran has undergone, and is probably still navigating, its most precarious period since the 1979 Revolution, with public discontent, trade and economic sanctions,

and unprecedented threats and foreign pressure for possible regime change (The Conversation, 2026).

The US-Israeli war with Iran, which commenced on 28 February 2026, codenamed Operation Epic Fury by the US, has caused remarkable disruption in global trade, especially in energy costs. The war witnessed bombings in Iran, Israel, Lebanon, and several of the Gulf countries, resulting in damage to buildings and the suffering of citizens.

Iran's sovereign claims to the Strait of Hormuz and its rhetoric in response to Trump's threats of total destruction of Iran or a 'regime-ending' blow have escalated the conflict, even with a fragile cease-fire in place. Amid these compelling issues for its survival, Iran has opened avenues for diplomatic negotiations while embarking on a domestic crackdown on opposition elements/citizens (Britannica, 2026).

Despite public threats, Iranian and US negotiators are holding talks for the resolution of contentious issues around enrichment of uranium for weapons, the unfreezing of \$6 billion in assets held in Qatar and the opening of the Strait of Hormuz (WSJ, 2026).

The conflict has exposed the fragility of the global energy markets and reinforced the need for the world to embrace alternatives to crude oil, while the Gulf states also pursue alternative trade routes outside of the Strait of Hormuz. On the other hand, Israel continues to insist on the total dismantlement of the Iranian missile project.

It is hoped that the US and other parties would allow reason to prevail and explore diplomatic measures to resolve the disputed issues. Notwithstanding what happens, the crises in the Middle East, especially the one with Iran, have weakened the image of President Trump. He has increasingly become consistently unreliable following several unfulfilled promises, threats and deadlines.

Israel's response to Trumpism represents a mix of strategic alignment and internal friction. Israel was initially sceptical of Trump's multilateral approach to becoming a central participant in the BoP. The Israeli perspective centres on a balance between its desire

for security and its diplomatic aspirations to avoid international isolation through US support.

Thus, Israel's support and participation in the BoP are seen as mandatory to enhance its relevance while decisions regarding Gaza's 'Phase II' demilitarisation are discussed. Additional motivations for Israel to support the BoP have to do with the fact that the BoP becomes the transactional forum for resolving regional disputes, thereby negating and reducing the influence of the UN and its opposition to Israel's government activities within and around Gaza. Israeli acceptance of Turkey and Qatar on the BoP's executive committee was in exchange for veto-like influence over specific reconstruction projects.

Israel insisted on Hamas's full disarmament before any reconstruction and has established a 'Yellow Line', which keeps being shifted to ease any domestic tensions and security concerns. Israel also demanded that the ISF, whose troops are expected to include Indonesia and Egypt, must achieve complete disarmament of Gaza to avert the need for necessary remedial actions. It is instructive to state that Israel plans to grant President Trump the Israel Prize in 2026, the first time a non-citizen has received the honour in nearly 80 years (Jerusalem Post, 2026).

The regional response to the ISF in Gaza has been mixed, largely due to concerns over its mandate. Egypt has tentatively agreed to provide troops to the ISF to secure the Rafah Crossing, while expressing concerns about the force's mandate. On the other hand, Turkey's Hakan Fidan joined the Gaza Executive Board but faces opposition from Israel, which remains sceptical of Turkish troops on its border.

A major point of contention is the Israeli-imposed 'Yellow Line' and Israel's continuous military onslaught in Lebanon. The ISF is confined to the humanitarian areas, while Israel maintains a security corridor in the North. Arab states argue this creates a permanent occupation under a different name, making them hesitant to deploy the more than symbolic contingents. However, Jordan insists that the BoP should be a collective security effort rather than a clientelist board.

It is important to note that Syria's new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, for whom the US had a 10 million USD bounty for terrorism related charges, has now been received and praised by President Trump for stabilising Syria. President Trump has also moved to withdraw sanctions on Syria following the fall of President Bashar al-Assad.

#### 4.7 African Union

Trumpism has resulted in a shift in the African Union (AU)'s relationship with the US from a development-partner relationship to a mainly transactional one (Kohnert, 2025). The AU has continually pushed for self-reliance to assert and defend members' national sovereignty against US interference in their internal affairs. The pushback by AU members has been fuelled by the Trump administration's weaponisation of aid and consistent interference in specific domestic issues.

In November 2025, the AU Commission rejected the US threats to cut aid to Nigeria over claims of religious persecution (specifically the killing of Christians). It asserted Nigeria's sovereign right to manage its internal security and the complexities of the local conflicts (Arisetv, 2025). US-South Africa relations have reached a historic low following the US imposition of a 30% tariff and the suspension of aid because of South Africa's legal actions at the ICJ (Menachem, 2026).

Again, the AU has criticised the US claim of genocide against the white race as an affront to post-apartheid governance. A negative development occasioned by Trumpism in Africa is the January 2026 expansion of visa bans on 39 countries and the requirement of \$15,000 'repatriation bonds', which the AU has condemned, calling for appropriate reciprocity (Al Jazeera, 2026).

The AU has restructured its economic strategy following the US dismantling of USAID as part of the Trump administration's MAGA policy. The extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in February 2026 would not be guaranteed until the end of the year.

To avert the grave consequences of Trump's universal tariffs, the AU has advised member states

to ensure that American content is included in their exports. It is expected that Trump's protectionism and MAGA policies would act as a catalyst for the African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA).

Thus, AU members need to accelerate the implementation of mechanisms to ensure that the lofty ideas of ACFTA are internalised and to enhance revenue from intra-African trade. One of Trumpism's means of pursuing its MAGA ideology is getting a reasonable piece of the pie in rare minerals across the world. The AU has accordingly pushed for the implementation of the African Green Minerals Strategy to prevent US or Chinese firms from extracting African mineral resources without adding local value (APRI, 2005).

The AU's mantra of 'African solutions to African problems' has not addressed the continent's security challenges. The ineffectiveness of this mantra is evident as the US moves toward unilateral operations across Africa and other regions of the world. Following the US withdrawal from Chad and Niger, the Trump administration has bypassed AU-led peacekeeping in favour of direct air strikes against ISIS positions, as seen in Nigeria on Christmas Day 2025 (Reuters, 2025).

The AU has warned that such uncoordinated interventions risk destabilising local communities and fuelling retaliatory attacks by aggrieved persons/members, although the possibility of such happening is remote. Trumpism, in a bid to MAGA, has substantially reduced funding for AU security and peacekeeping efforts.

Thus, the AU Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) is facing financial difficulty, and the AU has responded by seeking emergency financing from Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar to fill the gap left by the US (Africa Press, 2026). In addition, the AU is actively courting 'solvency partners' like the EU and G20 (which now has the AU as a permanent member) to hedge against US volatility to shore up its economic, security and power dynamics (Africa Press, 2026).

#### 4.8 Other Parts of the World

No region or country in the world is spared the impact of Trumpism. Thus, responses vary across

countries and regions globally. Globally, countries and regions are adapting differently to President Trump's transactional governance and the flexing of the US's enormous power to project his America First philosophy.

In Latin America, where the US has unilaterally intervened and is imposing unprecedented embargoes against free trade, narcotics and other forms of intervention against persons and interests adverse to the US, reactions and impacts vary. The US military offensive of 3 January 2026, Operation Absolute Resolve, ousted President Nicolás Maduro from Venezuela, with President Trump stating that the US now runs Venezuela, taking direct control of its oil sales (Brookings, 2026).

This has prevented the flow of subsidised oil products to Cuba, thereby gravely affecting the country's socioeconomic stability. Additionally, in February 2026, Trump signed an Executive Order authorising tariffs on any country that sells oil to Cuba, further deteriorating the oil crisis in Cuba.

Mexico and other Latin American countries are being pressured to stop all energy shipments to Cuba. The US border control measures have placed a significant strain on countries in the region. Mexico and Canada have been slapped with 25% tariffs linked to migrant and drug flows. In comparison, Brazil was hit with a 50% tariff, ostensibly to pressure the Brazilian judiciary regarding the legal status of former President Jair Bolsonaro (Peksen & Jeong, 2021).

Asia and India are grappling with a trade environment that has effectively brought the era of globalised free trade to an end. The US relations with India have substantially declined since 2025. This has forced the country to implement changes aimed at balancing expectations and reducing its dependence on the US to counter Trump's 'America First' demands. To assert its sovereignty and enhance trade amid US global tariffs, India imposed reciprocal 25% tariffs on all US goods in April 2025 (Pandey, 2026).

However, the US put an additional 25% 'punitive' tariff in August due to India's continued purchases of Russian oil. These huge tariffs have affected commerce and socioeconomic activities in India.

Trumpism's migration policy has led to a massive crackdown on student and H-1B work visas.

This has hit the Indian tech sector hard, leading the Modi government to accelerate its 'Pivot to Europe' and seek a trade deal with the EU as a hedge against the unreliability of the US (Pandey, 2026). Another sour point in US-India relations is President Trump's renewed friendliness toward Pakistan.

Most diplomats view the friendly relations with Pakistan as a reward for Islamabad's willingness to credit President Trump for resolving and effectively mediating in Kashmir tensions. The result of the friendship is Pakistan's participation and acceptance of the BoP.

The perceived unreliability of President Trump and the transactional nature of his relations have reinforced the ASEAN nations' desire to pursue a policy of 'Asia for Asians' in resolving their issues (Magpantay, 2023). This shift by ASEAN nations has given most countries the impetus to counter the trade war between their mightiest neighbour, China, and the US.

The US imposed global tariffs on Southeast Asian nations, with rates as high as 49% (Cambodia) and 46% (Vietnam), because they are considered proxies for Chinese manufacturing (Pandey, 2026). These unusually high tariffs have forced companies to build dual supply chains, one for the US and one for the rest of the world, to bypass tariffs. This has pushed nations like Malaysia and Indonesia closer to China's "Asia for Asians" economic vision (Free, O'Connor, & Wieland, 2026).

Again, Trumpism has significantly eroded the confidence of smaller nations in disputes over the South China Sea, while emboldening China. Although the US maintains a naval presence, Trump's transactional rhetoric has led allies like the Philippines (hit with a 17% tariff) to question the US's reliability in defending them in a non-transactional conflict.

In Australia and the South Pacific, President Trump's 'America First' policy and his MAGA agenda have significantly affected relations with Australia and the

security of the region. A key security alliance among Australia, the UK, and the US is being reviewed to serve US interests at the expense of the other parties.

This could have grave consequences for regional and global security if not handled well. Already, the transfer of Virginia-class submarines has been halted pending Australia's acceptance of greater strategic obligations, which would translate into higher costs and direct combat roles, thereby justifying any deal (Kurniawan, 2025).

These are classic transactional processes of Trumpism that disregard longstanding alliances and relationships. Consequently, Australians' trust in the US's capacity to act responsibly, given competing interests that may not align with Trumpism, has eroded. Thus, Australia is rapidly strengthening ties with Japan, South Korea, and the UK to reduce its dependency on the US.

## V THE WAY FORWARD

Certainly, President Donald Trump's tenure in the White House is only temporary. As has happened to all despotic, great, democratic, strong or weak leaders, the reign of President Trump shall surely come to an end. What would concern commentators, scholars, and all humans is how humanity and the world navigate the Trump era without incurring devastating, irreparable damage.

Answering this question would provide a viable remedy for all of humanity going forward. It is gratifying that the US Supreme Court has provided some relief by recently striking down some of President Trump's sweeping tariffs and executive orders. Thus, US institutions have some capacity to limit the powers and actions of the US president that could be injurious to US citizens and the world.

In addition, some workable solutions/strategies are proffered hereunder for consideration by the UN, nations and all those affected by the policies, actions and inactions occasioned by the implementation of Trumpism.

### 5.1 Soft Power and Establishment of Resilient Institutions

President Trump relies on the might of the US to bully and ultimately force through the ideology of Trumpism. While might may occasionally be right, soft power exerted through diplomatic manoeuvres could prove decisive at critical moments.

Thus, while major powers such as China, Russia and India continue to assert authority globally to curtail the US hegemonic power, middle powers (EU, Japan, Canada, Australia...) and regional powers (Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil...) could within their spheres of influence form mixed alliances to assert soft power capable of forcing the major powers to embrace a world that is rules-based.

The formation of the AU, BRICS+, ASEAN, and other regional and sub-regional organisations would ensure that global bullies and autocratic leaders are convinced that the world does not revolve around them alone.

### 5.2 Creation of Funding Mechanisms Outside of the US Aids

The massive reliance of several international organisations and nations on US funding/aids has been identified as one of the reasons Trumpism has succeeded in disrupting global governance.

To avoid disruption from the US, whether due to budget cuts or policy changes, global organisations, including regional and sub-regional organisations, must diversify their funding base. Therefore, the UN, development organisations/agencies, and impoverished nations should implement mechanisms to guarantee funding by managing resources reliably and in a structured manner, ensuring prompt contributions, while diversifying their donor bases to incorporate private philanthropy and contributions from emerging economies.

For nations reliant on US aid for survival, there is a need for institutionalised processes to avert corruption and ensure the judicious management of resources.

5.3 Adoption of Technical Multilateralism  
Nations would need to build their technical bases to ensure that they have multiple sources. The establishment of technical foundations free from political interference would ensure that nations and organisations survive disruptions stemming from ideologies such as Trumpism.

Thus, when political cooperation/alliances fail for whatever reason, nations should maintain technical-level cooperation in areas such as aviation safety, maritime law, cybersecurity, national security and other areas where US interests remain intrinsically linked.

These arrangements would ensure the continuation of essential services and the functioning of government regardless of political affiliations. It could invariably insulate global institutions from the vagaries of a President Trump and his actions or inactions.

5.4 Strengthening Regional Integration  
People within regions share affinities that bind them, irrespective of national boundaries. Therefore, to overcome Trumpism and several global disruptions, mechanisms need to be put in place to strengthen and deepen integration among regions, sub-regions, and peoples with common affinities.

Such integration could occur in trade, commerce, security, the provision of goods and services, and the management of shared natural resources. Regional and sub-regional blocs must therefore accelerate the enactment of enabling laws and the establishment of necessary bodies to drive integration so that they can be insulated from global shocks occasioned by Trumpism or other disruptive phenomena with catastrophic tendencies.

## VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The dilemma of Trumpism has gravely affected the world's geopolitical dynamics, with catastrophic consequences for global governance. The global occurrences have become faster and more decisive, but significantly more fragile because of President Trump's actions and inactions.

Global governance, usually aligned on a single moral compass calibrated by the UN, is no longer a single ladder but a series of competing interests, with the dominant one propelled by Trumpism and its shenanigans.

The UN has been relegated to a humanitarian safety net for the Global South and the voiceless. At the same time, the actual levers of power have shifted to Trump's BoP and to the major powers' creation of their spheres of influence. This new order delivers quicker short-term outcomes but lacks the universal legitimacy needed to address systemic threats to global governance.

The import of Trumpism is the normalisation of strength as right in global governance, and properly a gradual return to a chaotic global order. Now, some world leaders have begun to see President Trump as the moral compass for determining right and wrong.

The combined effects of US unilateralism, transactional alliances, the protection of America's interests through the MAGA policy, and other aspects of Trumpism have resulted in a world moving towards an era of selective multilateralism and the creation of spheres of influence by the major powers. Thus, nations, the UN and other organisations must seek ways to avert Trumpism in all its ramifications.

This study therefore recommends that nations, global and regional organisations should:

- a. Adopt soft power to diplomatically avert the impacts of Trumpism while establishing resilient institutions to curtail the US hegemonic power.
- b. Create viable funding mechanisms for guaranteeing financial independence to enable their survival outside of US aid.
- c. Establish technical alliances or multilateralism for cooperation in areas where the US has overbearing interests.
- d. Strengthen regional integration to deepen cooperation and coordination in areas of common interest.

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