

From Survival to Dominance: How Siddhartha Lal Repositioned Royal Enfield as India's Mid-Sized Motorcycle Leader

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Abstract- This paper examines how Royal Enfield moved from near-closure at the turn of the millennium to sustained leadership in India's mid-sized motorcycle market under the strategic stewardship of Siddhartha Lal. Using a longitudinal qualitative case-study approach based on company reports, official histories, industry data, published management interviews, scholarly literature, and reputable business reporting, the analysis argues that the turnaround was not the result of a single successful model. Rather, it emerged from a mutually reinforcing system of strategic focus, product modernization without identity dilution, operational discipline, category creation, community-based branding, patient capacity expansion, and selective globalization. Lal's central insight was that Royal Enfield should not imitate mass commuter manufacturers. The company instead sought to make accessible, character-rich motorcycles that occupied the space between utilitarian commuters and expensive large-capacity leisure motorcycles. The introduction of improved engines and platforms reduced the functional penalties historically associated with the brand, while products such as the Classic, Meteor, Hunter, Himalayan, Interceptor, and Continental GT broadened the addressable market without abandoning a coherent design language. Simultaneously, rides, owner communities, apparel, accessories, and experiential retail converted ownership into participation in a culture. The paper interprets the turnaround through the lenses of strategic focus, dynamic capabilities, resource-based advantage, brand heritage, organizational ambidexterity, category creation, and brand community. It concludes that Royal Enfield's defensible advantage lies less in any isolated technology than in an interdependent activity system linking heritage, design, accessible pricing, distribution, community, manufacturing scale, and managerial patience. The case offers broader lessons for leaders attempting to revive legacy businesses: protect the authentic core, remove avoidable customer pain, concentrate scarce resources, build a category rather than chase incumbents, and allow strategy sufficient time to compound.

Index Terms- Royal Enfield, Siddhartha Lal, Eicher Motors, turnaround strategy, strategic repositioning,

brand heritage, brand community, dynamic capabilities, mid-sized motorcycles, Indian automobile industry

I. INTRODUCTION

Corporate turnarounds are often narrated as heroic interventions: a new leader arrives, identifies a hidden opportunity, makes a bold decision, and rescues an organization. Such narratives are memorable, but they can obscure the cumulative, path-dependent nature of transformation. Royal Enfield's revival under Siddhartha Lal is best understood not as a single dramatic rescue but as a long sequence of mutually reinforcing choices. When Lal assumed leadership of Royal Enfield in 2000, the motorcycle business had accumulated losses, faced product-quality problems, and occupied a narrow niche in a market increasingly shaped by light, efficient, reliable commuter motorcycles. By the middle of the 2020s, Eicher Motors described Royal Enfield as the creator of India's mid-size motorcycle segment, while industry reporting continued to show extraordinary dominance in core displacement bands (Eicher Motors Limited, 2025, 2026; Financial Express, 2026).

The strategic puzzle is important because Royal Enfield did not follow the most obvious route available to a struggling motorcycle manufacturer. It did not attempt to match the volumes, mileage claims, dealer economics, or product cadence of India's commuter-bike leaders. Nor did it abandon its old-fashioned visual identity in pursuit of technological modernity. Instead, management attempted a more difficult reconciliation: preserve the tangible and symbolic cues that made the motorcycle recognizable while removing the unreliability, inconsistency, and ownership friction that limited adoption. In strategic terms, Royal Enfield

modernized the product without modernizing away the brand.

This paper argues that Royal Enfield's transformation rested on seven linked mechanisms. First, Eicher concentrated organizational attention and capital on a small number of businesses. Second, Royal Enfield improved engineering, manufacturing, quality, and service, thereby reducing the functional costs of owning a heritage product. Third, the company defined an accessible mid-sized motorcycling space rather than competing directly in the dominant commuter category. Fourth, it used heritage as a resource but translated heritage into contemporary experiences. Fifth, it treated riders as a community and motorcycles as platforms for identity and participation. Sixth, it expanded the portfolio around a coherent architecture rather than indiscriminately entering unrelated categories. Seventh, it globalized selectively, using modern-classic and adventure products to address an underserved international middleweight segment.

The case has significance beyond the automotive sector. Many legacy organizations face the same tension: heritage provides recognition and legitimacy, but inherited products, routines, and assumptions may prevent growth. The Royal Enfield experience suggests that successful renewal requires leaders to distinguish the organization's authentic core from the avoidable defects that have become associated with it. Nostalgia alone cannot sustain a business. Modernization alone can erase differentiation. The managerial task is to preserve meaning while rebuilding capability.

The paper also adopts a critical stance. Royal Enfield's dominance should not be treated as permanent or inevitable. Competitors backed by Honda, Bajaj, Triumph, Hero, Harley-Davidson, TVS, and Classic Legends have increased pressure. Product proliferation can blur identity; rapid scaling can weaken quality and service; international growth can expose the company to unfamiliar regulatory and consumer environments; and electrification can challenge a brand rooted in sound, mechanical feel, and combustion-era ritual. The same heritage that enabled revival can become strategic rigidity if management mistakes consistency for immobility.

II. RESEARCH PURPOSE, QUESTIONS, AND METHOD

The purpose of this study is to explain how leadership choices, organizational capabilities, market positioning, and brand meaning interacted over time to transform Royal Enfield. The primary research question is: How did Siddhartha Lal and the leadership system around Royal Enfield reposition a distressed legacy motorcycle business into the leader of India's mid-sized motorcycle market? Supporting questions examine which capabilities had to be rebuilt, how heritage was preserved while products were modernized, how community and experience strengthened differentiation, why competitors struggled to dislodge the company, and which future conditions could weaken its advantage.

The paper uses an exploratory longitudinal single-case design. Case research is appropriate when a phenomenon is inseparable from its organizational and historical context and when the aim is explanatory rather than narrowly predictive (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2018). The unit of analysis is Royal Enfield as a strategic business within Eicher Motors, with the period from 2000 through fiscal 2025–2026 receiving primary attention. Earlier history is included because acquired heritage and institutional memory shaped later positioning.

Evidence was triangulated across Eicher Motors annual reports and sustainability disclosures, Royal Enfield historical and management material, industry sales reporting, financial and business journalism, published cases, and academic work on competitive strategy, dynamic capabilities, brand heritage, organizational identity, communities, turnarounds, and category creation. Company sources are indispensable for chronology and operating data but naturally present management's preferred narrative. Journalistic and scholarly sources are therefore used to test, contextualize, and interpret company claims. The analysis follows temporal bracketing. The story is organized into historical inheritance, pre-turnaround crisis, strategic concentration, capability rebuilding, product-market breakthrough, scale expansion, portfolio broadening, and global ambition. Within each period, the analysis identifies managerial choices, capability changes, customer-value

implications, and observable outcomes. Pattern matching is then used to compare the case with established theoretical propositions, including Porter's activity-system view, Barney's resource-based view, Teece's dynamic-capabilities framework, and scholarship on brand communities and heritage brands.

The research has limitations. It does not use confidential company records, internal quality data, route-to-market economics, customer-level transactional data, or interviews conducted specifically for this paper. Causal attribution is therefore inferential. Segment definitions also differ across sources. Some reports use 250–350 cc, others 350–450 cc, and corporate material often refers to a broader 250–750 cc mid-size space. The paper avoids treating these classifications as interchangeable. Finally, Siddhartha Lal's contribution is central, but the transformation also depended on engineers, plant employees, suppliers, dealers, designers, marketers, riders, and successive senior leaders. A leadership case should not become a great-man account that erases collective execution.

III. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ROYAL ENFIELD

Royal Enfield's contemporary advantage begins with an unusually deep historical reservoir. The Royal Enfield name emerged from the late nineteenth-century British cycle and engineering business that secured work connected to the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield. The company built its first motorcycle in 1901, and the "Made Like a Gun" association became part of the brand's durable mythology. The Bullet appeared in the early 1930s and subsequently became one of the longest-running motorcycle nameplates. Heritage supplied more than chronology. It furnished visual codes, stories of mechanical ruggedness, military association, and a language of authenticity that later managers could reactivate. (Royal Enfield, n.d; Urde et al., 2007).

India became the decisive setting for the brand's continuity. Madras Motors began importing Royal Enfield motorcycles after independence, and an Indian Army order for 350 cc Bullets used for border patrol helped connect the product with endurance and

difficult terrain. Enfield India was established in the 1950s, with increasing localization and production in the Madras region. When the original British operations eventually ceased, the Indian enterprise preserved production and, over time, became the custodian of the global brand.

The Indian Bullet developed a distinctive social meaning. It was used by military and police institutions and associated with authority, durability, and masculine-coded road presence. It also developed a loyal enthusiast base that valued mechanical involvement, sound, stance, and continuity. Yet the same inherited characteristics created liabilities. Heavy controls, vibration, starting rituals, leakage, inconsistent electrics, and maintenance dependence could be reinterpreted by loyalists as "character," but mass consumers increasingly saw them as defects.

Eicher's acquisition of Enfield India in 1994 brought the motorcycle business into a wider industrial group. The acquisition preserved the brand, but ownership alone did not solve its structural problems. In the 1990s, India's two-wheeler market rewarded fuel economy, ease of use, standardized quality, and low running cost. Japanese technology and Indian manufacturing partnerships had recalibrated customer expectations. Against this benchmark, Royal Enfield risked becoming a museum piece: admired for its past, purchased by a narrow tribe, and unable to fund its future.

This historical duality is essential. Royal Enfield possessed scarce symbolic capital but weak contemporary capabilities. Many distressed firms have the opposite configuration: acceptable operations but little differentiation. The turnaround opportunity lay in combining existing meaning with rebuilt execution. Heritage would matter only if the company could make the brand usable by customers who admired the idea of Royal Enfield but rejected the friction of ownership.

IV. CRISIS AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM

By the time Siddhartha Lal became chief executive of Royal Enfield in 2000, the business was widely described as being in dire financial and operational

condition. Reported volumes were modest, accumulated losses were significant, customer complaints were persistent, and Eicher's leadership considered closure or divestment. The crisis was not merely financial. It represented a broken value proposition. The motorcycle's emotional appeal could not fully compensate for doubts regarding reliability, quality, service, and everyday usability. (Bibeault, 1982; Financial Express, 2023, 2026).

The market context amplified the challenge. The center of gravity in Indian motorcycles had moved toward efficient commuters. Competitors competed on mileage, starting convenience, refinement, price, and widespread service support. Royal Enfield lacked the scale to win this game and lacked the product characteristics expected by mainstream commuter buyers. A conventional turnaround might have pursued a smaller-displacement mass product, discounting, aggressive promotion, or superficial styling changes. Each route risked placing the company in direct competition with better-resourced incumbents on dimensions where it had no advantage.

The organization also faced low confidence among dealers and customers. Product faults create a reinforcing cycle: dissatisfied customers depress word of mouth; low volumes weaken dealer economics; weak dealer investment worsens sales and service; and constrained cash flow limits product improvement. Breaking such a cycle requires simultaneous action across product, process, channel, and perception. Isolated advertising cannot repair a motorcycle. Isolated engineering cannot overcome hostile retail and service experiences.

The crisis nevertheless contained strategic information. A small but committed customer base continued to value the motorcycles despite their shortcomings. This suggested that Royal Enfield possessed willingness-to-endure, a powerful but dangerous form of loyalty. The question was whether latent demand existed among consumers who desired the brand's meaning but would not accept its functional penalties. Lal's strategy effectively wagered that the addressable market was larger than current sales indicated.

Turnaround research distinguishes retrenchment from recovery. Retrenchment stabilizes the enterprise through cost control, asset reduction, and cash discipline; recovery builds a new basis for growth (Bibeault, 1982; Pearce & Robbins, 1993). Royal Enfield required both. Costs and complexity had to be reduced, but austerity alone would have preserved a shrinking niche. The company needed to reimagine what kind of motorcycle business it could credibly become.

V. SIDDHARTHA LAL AND THE LOGIC OF STRATEGIC FOCUS

Siddhartha Lal's importance lies partly in the consistency of the strategic question he imposed: where could Eicher and Royal Enfield become meaningfully distinctive? Eicher had accumulated a portfolio of businesses that dispersed management attention and investment. During the first half of the 2000s, most activities were sold or exited, leaving a concentrated commitment to motorcycles and commercial vehicles. Strategic focus increased risk because diversification cushions poor performance, but it also increased the quality of attention. Scarce leadership time, engineering capital, and organizational energy could be directed toward a smaller set of capabilities. (Porter, 1996; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).

Focus is frequently reduced to "doing fewer things." Porter (1996) offers a richer interpretation: strategy involves choosing a distinctive position and configuring an activity system whose elements reinforce one another. Royal Enfield's focus was not merely a narrower product list. It meant choosing the mid-sized leisure and lifestyle space; investing in products with a recognizable architecture; building an ownership community; maintaining accessible pricing relative to global premium brands; and developing retail, service, rides, apparel, and accessories consistent with "pure motorcycling."

Lal's personal engagement with motorcycles also mattered. Founder-like product intimacy can become meddling, but it can also provide an integrative customer perspective when an organization is relearning its market. Public accounts describe Lal as a rider who participated in testing and articulated

product requirements from lived use. His discussion of the Himalayan, for example, framed the motorcycle around the realities of Indian altitude, fuel availability, repairability, weight, rider stature, luggage, and terrain rather than around imitation of large European adventure motorcycles (Royal Enfield, n.d.). This reflects problem-led product definition.

The leadership approach combined patience with threshold discipline. Royal Enfield was not granted infinite indulgence because of heritage. Management demanded cost reduction, quality improvement, product renewal, and eventual scale. Yet the transformation was also allowed to unfold over years. This temporal balance is rare. Public companies frequently demand immediate volume growth, which can lead to discounting, overextension, and incoherent product entry. Royal Enfield's position compounded because management protected a long-term thesis while steadily removing execution barriers.

The case should not be romanticized as intuition defeating analysis. The underlying logic was economically grounded. Competing in commuters required huge scale and cost efficiency. Competing with imported large motorcycles required technology, price points, and customer purchasing power that constrained volume. The neglected middle offered room for a differentiated Indian manufacturer. Lal's insight was less "people will love old motorcycles" than "a sufficiently modern, accessible, emotionally resonant middleweight can create demand that existing category definitions fail to capture."

VI. PRODUCT AND ENGINEERING TRANSFORMATION

The turnaround's credibility depended on product improvement. Brand storytelling cannot indefinitely compensate for mechanical shortcomings. Royal Enfield progressively addressed engines, gearboxes, electrical systems, manufacturing tolerances, emissions compliance, starting convenience, braking, and overall usability. A major milestone was the unit-construction-engine architecture, which integrated major drivetrain elements into a more modern package and supported improved reliability,

manufacturing, and regulatory performance while retaining an air-cooled single-cylinder character. (Eicher Motors Limited, 2010–2026; Henderson & Clark, 1990).

The Classic 350 became the breakthrough expression of this philosophy. Visually, it was legible as a Royal Enfield: upright, substantial, simple, and connected to postwar motorcycle design. Functionally, it was easier to own than preceding generations. This combination expanded the market from committed loyalists to aspirational customers who wanted identity and road presence without accepting all of the old ownership burdens. The product did not seek maximum power-per-cubic-centimeter. It optimized for accessible torque, relaxed riding, visual permanence, and emotional familiarity.

Engineering renewal continued through platforms rather than one-off fixes. The J-series 350 platform supported products including the Meteor, new-generation Classic, Hunter, and Bullet, allowing commonality alongside differentiated ergonomics and customer propositions. The 650 twin platform enabled the Interceptor and Continental GT to reach global markets with a combination of simplicity, approachable performance, classic design, and price competitiveness. The Himalayan line established a distinct adventure proposition, while subsequent products extended the brand into roadsters and scramblers.

Platform strategy matters because variety creates both revenue opportunity and complexity. Shared engines, frames, components, suppliers, validation routines, and manufacturing processes can lower development and procurement costs while enabling multiple customer-facing products. However, excessive commonality can make the portfolio feel cosmetically differentiated. Royal Enfield's task has been to ensure each model expresses a recognizable use case: the Classic as timeless roadster, the Meteor as accessible cruiser, the Hunter as compact urban roadster, the Himalayan as an adventure tool, and the 650 twins as globally credible modern classics.

The company's technical-center investments in India and the United Kingdom signaled a transition from adaptation to capability ownership. International

design and engineering talent helped the company benchmark global standards, while Indian development preserved cost awareness and use-context relevance. This dual-location model supported “glocal” products: motorcycles designed to be credible in developed markets yet affordable and serviceable in India and other emerging markets.

Product transformation also required quality governance. Scaling a mechanically expressive product is difficult because customers notice inconsistency in sound, finish, vibration, controls, paint, and service behavior. Royal Enfield’s later growth indicates major improvement, but owner discussions and published customer studies continue to identify after-sales service, reliability variation, and maintenance experience as potential weaknesses. The strategic lesson is that heritage brands receive less forgiveness as they move from cult niche to mainstream scale. What enthusiasts call personality; new customers may call a defect.

VII. REPOSITIONING AND CATEGORY CREATION

Royal Enfield’s most consequential market decision was to avoid defining itself against high-volume commuter motorcycles. India’s mass two-wheeler market historically optimized transportation economics. Royal Enfield reframed the purchase around leisure, identity, exploration, and the pleasure of riding, while retaining enough practicality for everyday use. This repositioning raised the basis of competition from fuel economy and functional transport to accessible aspiration. (Levitt, 1960; Porter, 1980, 1985).

Category creation does not necessarily mean inventing a technology or displacement band. It can mean making a previously marginal combination meaningful and scalable. Royal Enfield connected moderate engine capacity, classic design, manageable performance, local manufacturing, attainable pricing, and community participation. The resulting “mid-size” category was not merely a technical interval between small and large engines. It became a distinct social and economic proposition: a motorcycle substantial enough to feel special, simple enough to

understand, and affordable enough to become a realistic upgrade.

The strategy benefited from favorable socioeconomic changes. Rising incomes, urbanization, credit access, weekend mobility, social media, highway development, and the emergence of experiential consumption increased demand for motorcycles purchased partly for self-expression. Yet macro conditions alone cannot explain Royal Enfield’s share. Competitors operated in the same economy. Royal Enfield had spent years building the mental availability, dealer presence, product legitimacy, and ritual infrastructure required to convert those shifts into sales.

Pricing was central. Royal Enfield generally occupied a premium relative to commuters but remained far below many imported or large-capacity global motorcycles. This “accessible premium” position reduced direct comparison with 100–150 cc transportation products while offering customers symbolic and experiential value at a fraction of traditional big-bike costs. The company could therefore earn healthier economics than commodity commuters without depending on tiny luxury volumes.

By fiscal 2025–2026, industry reporting estimated that Royal Enfield retained approximately 93% of the 250–350 cc segment, selling about 1.02 million motorcycles in a segment of roughly 1.1 million units. Broader 350–450 cc calculations produce lower but still commanding shares because they include a wider field of products and displacement classifications (Financial Express, 2026; RushLane, 2026). These figures should not be conflated, but together they demonstrate that Royal Enfield did more than participate in an existing category; it shaped the reference point against which competitors are judged.

VIII. BRAND HERITAGE, MEANING, AND COMMUNITY

Brand heritage can create credibility, continuity, and emotional depth, but only when the past is made relevant to the present (Urde et al., 2007). Royal Enfield used recurring assets including the Bullet

lineage, military association, the “Made Like a Gun” mythology, the thump, tank forms, badges, metal surfaces, and stories of difficult journeys. These assets created recognition and an impression of authenticity that newer entrants could imitate aesthetically but could not easily reproduce historically.

Heritage was not treated solely as archival communication. It was enacted through products and experiences. Owners did not merely hear that Royal Enfield had an adventure tradition; they could join rides, attend Rider Mania or Motoverse-type gatherings, purchase luggage and apparel, visit distinctive stores, customize motorcycles, and share journeys within organized and informal communities. This gave customers roles within the brand narrative.

Muniz and O’Guinn (2001) define a brand community through shared consciousness, rituals and traditions, and a sense of moral responsibility. Royal Enfield communities exhibit many of these features. Riders recognize one another, exchange maintenance knowledge, organize trips, document ownership, preserve model lore, and socialize newcomers into the practices of long-distance and group riding. Community lowers customer-acquisition costs through advocacy, but its deeper value is defensibility. A competitor can produce a similar specification sheet faster than it can reproduce decades of identity, stories, clubs, routes, and social ties.

The brand also benefited from productive imperfection. Highly optimized products can become interchangeable when every competitor converges on smoothness, efficiency, and electronic features. Royal Enfield historically possessed sensory signatures: pulse, sound, visual mass, mechanical rhythm, and modest performance that encouraged a slower style of riding. Management’s challenge was to preserve sufficient character while eliminating unreliability and discomfort that limited the market. This is the essence of modernization without identity dilution.

Community-led branding carries risks. A highly vocal core can resist products intended for new customers, condemn refinement as loss of

authenticity, or police who counts as a “real rider.” Royal Enfield’s expansion into the Hunter, modern electronics, liquid-cooled adventure products, and electric mobility can therefore create identity negotiation. The company must avoid allowing legacy loyalists to veto adaptation while still treating community memory as strategic intelligence.

IX. OPERATIONS, DISTRIBUTION, AND CAPACITY

Strategy became scalable only when operations caught up with demand. Royal Enfield expanded beyond its historic Tiruvottiyur facility into larger manufacturing locations including Oragadam, Vallam Vadagal, and later additional capacity. Eicher’s integrated reports describe four domestic manufacturing facilities and a growing network of international assembly operations. Capacity investment reduced waiting periods, supported portfolio growth, and improved the company’s ability to serve both domestic and export markets (Eicher Motors Limited, 2025, 2026). (Eicher Motors Limited, 2018–2026; Grant, 1991).

Distribution expansion was equally important. A lifestyle category cannot grow nationally if it remains confined to metropolitan enthusiasts. Royal Enfield developed a widespread sales and service footprint, including formats intended to reach smaller towns. Physical availability strengthened mental availability: motorcycles became visible in local markets, test rides became practical, financing became easier, and service anxiety declined. For a heavy durable good, the channel is part of the product.

Dealer economics influence customer experience. Rapid network growth can produce inconsistent standards, aggressive upselling, variable service quality, and uneven technical capability. Royal Enfield’s scale makes channel governance increasingly complex because expectations differ across legacy owners, first-time premium buyers, international customers, and riders purchasing more sophisticated products. Training, parts availability, diagnostics, warranty discipline, customer communication, and escalation resolution therefore remain strategic capabilities.

The supplier ecosystem also supported the turnaround. Motorcycles involve hundreds of components whose quality interactions determine the final experience. Platform consolidation, supplier development, manufacturing-process control, and volume growth can create cumulative cost and quality advantages. Once Royal Enfield crossed a scale threshold, suppliers could justify dedicated tooling and process improvement, which further improved economics and reliability. This is a flywheel unavailable to small competitors.

Operational scale must nevertheless remain subordinate to brand strategy. Overproduction followed by discounting can weaken accessible-premium positioning. Excessive model proliferation can raise inventory and parts complexity. International assembly can reduce tariffs and improve market access, but it requires consistent quality governance. The operating system must therefore balance utilization, responsiveness, and scarcity without turning the brand into a commodity volume machine.

X. PORTFOLIO ARCHITECTURE AND MARKET EXPANSION

Royal Enfield's portfolio growth can be read as a sequence of adjacency moves. The Classic and Bullet protected the heritage core. The Meteor translated the architecture into a more comfort-oriented cruiser. The Hunter lowered physical and stylistic barriers for urban and younger customers. The Himalayan created an accessible adventure category grounded in Indian terrain. The Interceptor and Continental GT used the 650 twin platform to establish international credibility. Subsequent roadsters, scramblers, and premium derivatives expanded choice while retaining visual and experiential coherence. (Eicher Motors Limited, 2024, 2025; Teece, 2007).

The Hunter 350 is strategically notable because it challenged assumptions about what a Royal Enfield must look and feel like. It is more compact, lighter in visual character, and oriented toward urban accessibility. Rather than forcing every new buyer to adopt the full weight of Bullet symbolism, the Hunter created an entry point into the brand. Industry reporting identifies it as an important growth driver

among younger and first-time customers (Financial Express, 2026).

The Himalayan demonstrates capability extension. The original proposition was not a retro restyling exercise; it was a use-case motorcycle designed around rough roads, altitude, luggage, repairability, and approachable ergonomics. Later generations introduced more sophisticated engineering while attempting to preserve functional simplicity. The product gave Royal Enfield legitimacy in adventure motorcycling and generated halo effects for the broader brand.

The 650 twins changed external perceptions. International reviewers frequently evaluated the Interceptor and Continental GT not as inexpensive Indian curiosities but as credible modern classics. Twin-cylinder refinement, approachable power, design clarity, and aggressive value positioning allowed Royal Enfield to participate in markets where 350 cc singles might feel underpowered. This created a bridge from domestic category dominance to global middleweight ambition.

Portfolio expansion should be evaluated against a coherence test. Does a new product serve a distinct rider, occasion, or geography? Does it share capabilities that improve economics? Does it add to the meaning of "pure motorcycling"? Does it recruit customers without making the core unrecognizable? Products that fail these tests may add short-term volume while increasing long-term ambiguity.

XI. COMPETITIVE POSITION AND SEGMENT LEADERSHIP

Royal Enfield's share advantage reflects more than first-mover timing. Honda's 350 products, Jawa and Yezdi under Classic Legends, Triumph motorcycles produced with Bajaj, Harley-Davidson's X440 developed with Hero MotoCorp, and products from TVS, BMW, KTM, and others demonstrate that competitors recognize the segment's attractiveness. Yet the challenger problem is asymmetric. Royal Enfield needs to defend a category it helped normalize; rivals must persuade customers to depart from the category's default reference brand. (Financial Express, 2026; Porter, 1985).

Competitors often possess stronger parent-company technology, quality systems, or global reputations. However, they may face a positioning dilemma. Matching Royal Enfield's classic cues too closely appears derivative. Differentiating through sportiness or technology changes the basis of comparison but may not capture the emotional demand that sustains classic middleweights. Pricing above Royal Enfield constrains volume; pricing below it can undermine premium signaling and economics.

Royal Enfield also benefits from portfolio density. A prospective customer can compare motorcycles within the brand across classic, cruiser, urban, adventure, and twin-cylinder propositions. This internal choice architecture allows the company to retain customers whose preferences evolve. A single-model challenger must win the brand decision and the product decision simultaneously.

Network effects further strengthen leadership. More motorcycles on the road support more trained mechanics, more parts, more resale-market liquidity, more accessories, more clubs, more online advice, and more social proof. These indirect network effects reduce perceived ownership risk. Market share therefore creates customer value beyond visibility.

Dominance can produce complacency. Competitors need not replicate the entire Royal Enfield system immediately. They can attack specific pain points such as service quality, refinement, performance, technology, weight, or urban usability. Royal Enfield must treat market share as evidence of historical success rather than proof of future entitlement.

XII. INTERNATIONALIZATION AND GLOBAL AMBITION

Internationalization serves both growth and strategic validation. Royal Enfield's ambition has been to lead the global mid-sized motorcycle market rather than remain an Indian domestic champion. The company expanded subsidiaries, distribution, technical capabilities, and assembly arrangements across multiple regions. Eicher's reporting identifies operations and assembly relationships in markets including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Thailand, alongside subsidiaries in

North America, Europe, Brazil, and Thailand (Eicher Motors Limited, 2026). (Eicher Motors Limited, 2025, 2026; Teece, 2007).

The international proposition differs by market. In India, a 350 cc Royal Enfield can represent a substantial aspirational upgrade. In Europe or North America, it may function as a second motorcycle, an entry motorcycle, a simple alternative to technology-heavy machines, or a stylish urban product. The 650 platform is particularly important because it provides performance more closely aligned with developed-market expectations while preserving accessibility.

Global expansion increases the importance of regulatory capability, emissions development, product liability, parts logistics, dealer quality, and brand translation. Heritage that resonates in India may require different storytelling abroad. Conversely, the British origin of Royal Enfield offers legitimacy in some Western markets, while Indian continuity provides a distinctive survival narrative. The brand can credibly claim both British roots and Indian custodianship.

International manufacturing and assembly reduce tariff barriers and improve responsiveness, but they can fragment quality if governance is weak. Royal Enfield's global strategy should therefore prioritize markets where mid-sized simplicity is underserved, establish service credibility before accelerating volume, and avoid chasing every geography merely to claim presence.

Global ambition also disciplines the domestic organization. Products must satisfy more stringent customer expectations and regulatory regimes. International reviews provide feedback unfiltered by nostalgia. Success abroad can therefore strengthen design and engineering capabilities that benefit Indian customers.

XIII. THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION

From a resource-based perspective, Royal Enfield's heritage, brand recognition, community, organizational memory, and accumulated design language are valuable and difficult to imitate (Barney, 1991). However, resources do not create

advantage automatically. The company had these assets during decline. Advantage emerged only when complementary capabilities allowed management to organize and exploit them. The case therefore supports a dynamic rather than static resource-based explanation.

Teece's dynamic-capabilities framework emphasizes sensing opportunities and threats, seizing opportunities through investment and business-model choices, and transforming organizational assets (Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2007). Royal Enfield sensed an underserved middleweight space, seized it through engineering, capacity, channel, and brand investment, and transformed from a troubled legacy manufacturer into a category-building global business. Repeated platform and portfolio renewal shows that the capability extended beyond one successful product.

Porter's activity-system concept explains defensibility. Royal Enfield's advantage is not reducible to the Classic 350, heritage advertising, dealer count, or price. It lies in fit among product character, local cost structure, accessible premium pricing, community events, rides, apparel, service reach, resale liquidity, platform economics, and global design capability. Competitors can copy an element, but copying the system requires time and consistency.

The brand-heritage literature explains how continuity produces authenticity when stakeholders perceive alignment between past identity and present action (Urde et al., 2007; Balmer, 2013). Royal Enfield did not merely place old badges on generic motorcycles. Its strongest products translated historical cues into current engineering. This continuity helps customers interpret modernization as evolution rather than betrayal.

Brand-community theory explains advocacy, rituals, and social embeddedness (Muniz & O'Guinn, 2001; McAlexander et al., 2002). Royal Enfield ownership can connect customer, product, brand, retailer, and other riders. Such relationships convert consumption into membership and raise switching costs that are social and symbolic rather than contractual.

Organizational ambidexterity provides another lens. Royal Enfield exploited its proven 350 cc heritage while exploring adventure motorcycles, twin-cylinder platforms, international markets, digital connectivity, and electric mobility (March, 1991; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2013). The strategic challenge is not choosing tradition or innovation. It is structuring both so that exploration does not destroy identity and exploitation does not create stagnation.

Finally, the case illustrates category construction. Markets are cognitively organized through labels and expectations. By repeatedly associating moderate displacement with leisure, authenticity, and accessible aspiration, Royal Enfield helped institutionalize "mid-size motorcycling" as a meaningful category in India. Once established, the category attracted competitors, media comparisons, financing, retail investment, and consumer consideration, further increasing its reality.

XIV. CRITICAL EVALUATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS

Turnaround narratives risk survivorship bias. Because Royal Enfield succeeded, its choices can appear obviously correct in retrospect. At the time, concentrating Eicher's portfolio and investing in a loss-making motorcycle brand exposed the group to substantial risk. A prolonged quality failure, regulatory shock, recession, or unsuccessful engine program could have produced a different outcome.

A useful counterfactual is mass-market entry. Had Royal Enfield launched a conventional 100–150 cc commuter, it might have increased addressable volume but entered a brutally competitive category where its heritage provided limited advantage. The product could also have diluted the brand's association with substantial motorcycles. The decision not to chase the largest market preserved strategic clarity.

A second counterfactual is luxury migration. Royal Enfield might have pursued large-displacement premium motorcycles and smaller volumes. This would have strengthened exclusivity but sacrificed accessibility, supplier scale, and the ability to create a broad Indian riding culture. The middleweight

position captured aspiration without requiring luxury incomes.

A third counterfactual is pure nostalgia. Management could have preserved old designs and mechanical systems with minimal modernization. This may have retained purists but would have constrained emissions compliance, reliability, and mainstream acceptance. The UCE, J-series, 650 twin, and newer adventure platforms show that the company modernized materially even when styling communicated continuity.

Attribution must also be distributed. Lal supplied strategic direction and symbolic leadership, but execution required a system. Product leaders, engineers, manufacturing teams, suppliers, quality professionals, dealers, marketers, finance leaders, and riders collectively converted intent into outcome. A robust analysis recognizes leadership without implying that one executive personally engineered every capability.

Finally, market leadership may partly reflect classification choices. Royal Enfield's reported dominance is strongest in the 250–350 cc band where its portfolio is concentrated. Broader definitions incorporating 400–500 cc sport, adventure, and roadster products produce a more competitive picture. Responsible analysis should celebrate dominance without manipulating category boundaries.

XV. FUTURE RISKS AND STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

The first future risk is identity dilution. As Royal Enfield introduces more motorcycles, engines, technologies, and price points, the portfolio may lose a clear organizing idea. “Pure motorcycling” must remain operational rather than rhetorical. Each product should privilege intuitive control, rider engagement, purposeful design, and understandable technology.

The second risk is quality and service inconsistency. A million-unit-scale brand cannot depend on enthusiast tolerance. Royal Enfield should continue strengthening first-time-right manufacturing, dealer

diagnostics, parts fill rates, transparent service estimates, technician certification, digital case management, and closed-loop learning from warranty and social-listening data.

The third risk is competitive compression. Bajaj–Triumph, Hero–Harley-Davidson, Honda, TVS, Classic Legends, and global brands can combine local manufacturing with sophisticated products. Royal Enfield should resist a specification arms race that moves it away from accessible character, while ensuring that braking, safety, thermal management, electronics, refinement, and performance meet contemporary expectations.

The fourth risk is electrification. Electric motorcycles challenge a brand whose sensory identity includes engine pulse and exhaust character. Royal Enfield's response should not imitate electric scooters. The company needs to define what emotionally engaging, simple, authentic electric motorcycling means. Design, tactility, proportion, ride experience, customization, and community may become more important as combustion sound recedes.

The fifth risk is international overreach. Market entry without strong service can damage reputation faster than slow expansion. The company should prioritize depth in selected markets, support dealers with parts and technical capability, and tailor product-market fit rather than pursuing geographic count.

The sixth risk is founder-shadow dependence. Although Lal remains a major strategic figure, institutional resilience requires a leadership pipeline capable of interpreting the brand without waiting for a single custodian. Decision principles should be embedded in portfolio governance, product-development gates, leadership development, and cultural narratives.

A final priority is data-informed community stewardship. Royal Enfield should use customer analytics to identify emerging needs, but avoid reducing communities to marketing databases. Trust depends on reciprocity. The company should continue investing in safe riding, route support, inclusive communities, women riders, novice

education, sustainability, and local cultural participation.

XVI. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT LESSONS

The first lesson is to distinguish essence from defect. Royal Enfield's essence included visual continuity, mechanical involvement, road presence, heritage, and accessible adventure. Oil leaks, difficult ownership, inconsistency, and unreliable components were not essence. Leaders of legacy organizations must avoid defending avoidable weakness as authenticity.

The second lesson is that focus is a capability multiplier. Eicher's divestment of peripheral businesses concentrated capital, senior attention, and accountability. Focus did not guarantee success, but it created conditions under which learning could compound.

The third lesson is to choose the field of competition. Royal Enfield did not accept the commuter market's dominant decision criteria. It invited customers to evaluate motorcycles through identity, leisure, story, and experience. Strategic repositioning is often less about outperforming incumbents on established metrics than about changing which metrics matter.

The fourth lesson is that communities can be operating assets. Rider groups, events, trips, customization, and ownership rituals were not merely promotional tactics. They produced insight, advocacy, retention, and meaning. Leaders should ask what customers can do with one another because the organization exists.

The fifth lesson is to use platforms without becoming generic. Shared architecture generated scale, but customer propositions remained differentiated. This principle applies beyond manufacturing: common processes and technology can coexist with distinct experiences when design choices are disciplined.

The sixth lesson is to allow strategic patience but reject operational complacency. Royal Enfield's transformation took years, yet patience was accompanied by engineering milestones, network changes, capacity decisions, and portfolio renewal.

Long-term thinking is not permission to avoid short-term evidence of progress.

The seventh lesson is to treat heritage as a verb. Heritage must be enacted through design, behavior, products, and experiences. Organizations that merely advertise their past are nostalgic. Organizations that translate inherited meaning into contemporary value are strategically authentic.

The eighth lesson is that dominance creates responsibility. A category leader must continue expanding the category, improving safety, developing suppliers, upgrading service, and setting standards. Extracting value without renewing the ecosystem eventually invites disruption.

XVII. THE 650 CC PLATFORM: FROM DOMESTIC ASPIRATION TO GLOBAL CREDIBILITY

The 648 cc parallel-twin platform represents one of the most consequential capability leaps in Royal Enfield's modern history. Introduced through the Interceptor 650 and Continental GT 650, the platform enabled the company to be evaluated against global middleweight motorcycles rather than only against Indian single-cylinder competitors. Royal Enfield deliberately prioritized tractable torque, mechanical accessibility, approachable performance, relaxed road manners, and price-value balance over a specification contest (Eicher Motors Limited, 2019, 2020; Royal Enfield, 2018).

The Interceptor 650 provided a neutral roadster format, while the Continental GT 650 used café-racer ergonomics and styling to appeal to a more focused enthusiast segment. The shared platform illustrates architectural leverage because common powertrain, supplier, validation, and manufacturing investments support distinct customer propositions. It also strengthened perceptions of Royal Enfield's engineering maturity and helped reposition the company from a producer of nostalgic singles into a credible global middleweight manufacturer (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).

Royal Enfield subsequently extended the twin-cylinder platform into the Super Meteor 650, Shotgun 650, Bear 650, and Classic 650. At EICMA 2024, Royal Enfield described the Bear 650 and Classic 650 as additions to a broader 650 Twin family and reported a portfolio across four platforms and 14 models (Royal Enfield, 2024). These products demonstrate how a shared architecture can span roadster, café racer, cruiser, custom-inspired roadster, scrambler, and heritage-classic formats without requiring a separate engine family for every niche.

The Super Meteor 650 moved Royal Enfield toward a more premium cruiser position and tested the engine's ability to serve sustained highway-touring expectations. The Shotgun 650 emphasized modularity and customization. The Bear 650 translated the twin into a scrambler-oriented proposition, while the Classic 650 connected the company's strongest heritage vocabulary with its globally credible engine. Together, these models form a progression from the high-volume 350 cc franchise to richer and more internationally legible middleweight products (Eicher Motors Limited, 2024, 2025; Porter, 1996).

The strategic benefit of the 650 family is not limited to cost sharing. Portfolio density allows a customer attracted to the Royal Enfield twin to remain within the brand while selecting a posture, aesthetic, and use case that better matches individual preference. It also increases the relevance of the dealer network in markets where a 350 cc single may be viewed as an entry or urban motorcycle. However, commonality must not become badge engineering. Each derivative must generate an identifiable riding and ownership proposition if the portfolio is to remain coherent (Siggelkow, 2002; Zott & Amit, 2010).

The 650 family also changes the economics of internationalization. In developed markets, larger-capacity twins more closely match highway expectations and support higher transaction values, accessories, apparel, and touring use. Indian manufacturing allows Royal Enfield to maintain an accessible-premium position relative to many established European and Japanese middleweights. The platform therefore operates as an organizational bridge between domestic category dominance and

global middleweight ambition (Porter, 1985; Teece, 2007).

XVIII. FLYING FLEA AND THE TRANSITION TO ELECTRIC MOTORCYCLING

Royal Enfield's transition toward electric mobility is being pursued through Flying Flea, a distinct brand born within the Royal Enfield universe. Flying Flea draws its name from the lightweight Royal Enfield motorcycle developed during the Second World War and designed to be transported by air. The first contemporary product, the FF.C6, converts this historical association with lightness and agility into a technology-led City+ electric-mobility proposition (Royal Enfield, 2025; Flying Flea, 2026).

The decision to use a dedicated sub-brand is strategically important. Flying Flea can experiment with electric architecture, software, connectivity, lightweight materials, and new urban customer occasions without forcing an electric motorcycle to imitate the Classic or Bullet. This provides a form of organizational ambidexterity: the core business continues exploiting combustion platforms and heritage equity while Flying Flea explores an emerging technological regime (March, 1991; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2013).

Royal Enfield presented Flying Flea at EICMA 2024 with two models, the classic-styled C6 and scrambler-styled S6. The company described the new brand as a future-oriented expression inspired by its past and positioned around lightweight agility, advanced technology, and lifestyle-oriented smart mobility (Royal Enfield, 2024). By February 2025, the company had publicly showcased the C6 in India as its first electric motorcycle under the Flying Flea brand (Royal Enfield, 2025).

Official product information describes C6 as combining a neo-vintage silhouette with a high-voltage electrical architecture, magnesium battery casing, forged aluminium chassis, belt drive, proprietary Fleaware operating system, rider-assistance functions, and connected features. Official product information states that the battery uses 224 laser-welded nickel-cobalt-aluminium cells and that the motorcycle includes multiple ride modes, cruise

control, lean-angle sensing ABS, crawl functionality, and auto-hold (Flying Flea, 2026). These details indicate that Royal Enfield is developing software and electronic-control capabilities rather than merely purchasing an electric drivetrain and placing it within a conventional frame.

The identity challenge is substantial. Combustion-era Royal Enfield products derive meaning from pulse, sound, torque delivery, mechanical ritual, and long-distance narratives. Electric drivetrains remove or alter several of those signals. Flying Flea must therefore create new sources of character through low mass, tactility, visual transparency, customization, intuitive software, urban agility, and community experiences. This represents modernization through reinterpretation rather than direct sensory replication (Brown et al., 2003; Holt, 2004; Urde et al., 2007).

The C6 should not be judged solely by immediate volume. Early strategic value includes building EV competence, attracting software and electronics talent, learning battery and powertrain integration, establishing cybersecurity and over-the-air update processes, understanding charging behavior, and developing new retail and service routines. These are option-building investments whose benefits may appear across later products and platforms (Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997).

Flying Flea is consequently a test of whether Royal Enfield's organizing idea of pure motorcycling is independent of internal combustion. If the company can create a machine that feels simple, distinctive, rider-centered, and culturally resonant without relying on exhaust sound or engine pulse, it will demonstrate that the deeper identity concerns engagement rather than a particular technology. If not, the initiative may reveal that the company's equity remains more tightly connected to combustion nostalgia than management intends.

XIX. THE REPORTED HIMALAYAN 750 AND THE NEXT STAGE OF PLATFORM AMBITION

The anticipated Himalayan 750 represents a different form of strategic extension. Whereas Flying Flea explores a new powertrain and an urban mobility

occasion, the Himalayan 750 is widely reported as a larger twin-cylinder adventure-tourer intended to deepen Royal Enfield's position in global middleweight adventure motorcycling. As of September 2026, Royal Enfield had not published final production specifications in the sources reviewed for this paper. Timelines, output figures, equipment, and market positioning should therefore be treated as reported expectations rather than confirmed facts (BikeDekho, 2025; LatestLY, 2026). Public reporting and repeated prototype sightings suggest that the Himalayan 750 is under active development and may use a larger derivative of Royal Enfield's twin-cylinder architecture. Industry sources anticipate stronger highway performance, enhanced braking and chassis hardware, and a touring-oriented proposition positioned above the Himalayan 450. These reports are useful as strategic signals but do not substitute for official homologation or launch information (BikeDekho, 2025; CarToq, 2026; LatestLY, 2026).

Strategically, a larger Himalayan could occupy the space between the accessible Himalayan 450 and more expensive global middleweight adventure motorcycles. Customers touring with luggage or a pillion may value greater overtaking reserve, stronger high-speed performance, enhanced braking, adjustable suspension, and more extensive electronics. At the same time, the product must preserve the accessibility, ergonomics, durability, and terrain-centered logic that made the Himalayan proposition distinctive (Royal Enfield, n.d.)

A 750-class adventure platform could strengthen Royal Enfield in Europe, North America, Australia, and other markets where sustained highway speed materially affects purchase decisions. Adventure motorcycles can also produce substantial accessory revenue through luggage, crash protection, navigation support, seats, windscreens, apparel, and touring equipment. The opportunity therefore extends beyond unit sales to a broader customer-lifetime-value system (Porter, 1985; Zott & Amit, 2010).

The project also creates brand and execution risk. A larger and more complex motorcycle may gain specification strength while losing the repair-conscious simplicity and manageable character

associated with the Himalayan. Adventure customers evaluate products under severe conditions, and early reliability failures can spread quickly through owner communities. Validation, thermal management, braking, suspension, electronics, parts readiness, technician capability, and warranty discipline should therefore take priority over accelerated launch visibility.

If successfully executed, the Himalayan 750 would contribute to a multi-direction growth architecture. The 350 cc family provides domestic scale and accessible heritage; the 450 cc and 650 cc families provide capability, adjacency, and international credibility; Flying Flea develops electric options; and a larger Himalayan platform could move Royal Enfield toward premium global adventure touring. The central strategic test is whether these directions continue to express one coherent idea of purposeful and accessible motorcycling (Porter, 1996; Siggelkow, 2002).

XX. CONCLUSION

Royal Enfield's journey from survival to dominance is a case of disciplined strategic coherence. Siddhartha Lal and the broader leadership system did not rescue the company by discarding its past or by preserving it unchanged. They identified a valuable but trapped identity, concentrated organizational resources, repaired the product and operating system, created an accessible mid-sized category, and built a community-rich brand whose elements reinforced one another.

The company's market leadership emerged from fit. Heritage made the motorcycles meaningful. Engineering made them usable. Local manufacturing made them attainable. Distribution made them available. Community made them social. Portfolio architecture made the brand expandable. International capability made the ambition larger than the domestic niche. None of these elements fully explains the outcome alone.

The central proposition of this paper is therefore that Royal Enfield did not merely capture the mid-sized motorcycle market in India. It helped construct that market by giving customers a reason to desire a

motorcycle beyond transportation and below traditional luxury. Its most durable accomplishment was changing the meaning of a moderate-capacity motorcycle from an awkward middle into an aspirational destination.

The future will test whether the activity system remains adaptive. New competitors, electric propulsion, rising customer expectations, international complexity, and portfolio breadth will place pressure on the very identity that enabled growth. Continued dominance will depend on repeating the logic of the original turnaround: listen closely to real riders, preserve the authentic core, remove unnecessary friction, invest patiently in capability, and resist competition on dimensions that do not reinforce the brand.

For leaders beyond the motorcycle industry, the case offers a practical message. Legacy is neither an asset nor a liability by itself. Legacy becomes an advantage when leaders understand what must remain recognizable, what must be rebuilt, and what new category the organization is uniquely positioned to create.

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