AI-DRIVEN FAULT DETECTION

Risk-Based Quality Assurance and Predictive Fault Detection in Electrical and Instrumentation Systems for Smart Oilfields

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Abstract

Smart oilfields increasingly depend on an integrated electrical distribution system, instrument loops, control networks, and data infrastructure. Degradation of this often-invisible infrastructure can significantly affect production and process safety. This paper describes a risk-based quality assurance framework which links design verification, commissioning evidence, condition monitoring and predictive fault detection. A systematic, integrative synthesis of relevant peer-reviewed engineering literature separates the various failure mechanisms (physical, measurement, algorithmic, and management). It is concluded that detection accuracy in itself is not enough. Alarms need to be conditioned on the consequences of failure, have reliable sensing, traceable decisions and independent protection. A layered framework is proposed for asset prioritisation, signal validation, fusion of physical and statistical models and the control of maintenance actions. Transferability from laboratory motors and other adjacent industries is limited by load variation, the lack of failure labels, and the lack of documentation. The resulting agenda includes prospective field validation, calibrated uncertainty, cyber-secure interoperability, and assurance of both the equipment and the predictive system.

Keywords: asset integrity; condition monitoring; digital twin; electrical and instrumentation systems; predictive fault detection; risk-based quality assurance; smart oilfields

1 Introduction

A smart oilfield coordinates extraction equipment, field instruments, electrical drives, substations, distributed control systems, and remote communications. You have an operational chain in which a failing voltage supply can destabilise a variable speed drive, and a biased pressure transmitter can cause the system to take the wrong action even if the rotating equipment is perfectly sound. The traditional approach to assurance has been to decouple inspection completion from operational evidence. You can therefore have perfectly satisfactory test records alongside an incipient fault that only manifests under dynamic loading. The increasing availability of historian data offers an opportunity to re-establish the link between quality verification and functional reliability, but it also magnifies the impact of poor measurement quality. Reviews of petroleum maintenance and industrial predictive analytics point to real progress in the field but also to significant fragmentation and limited transferability [7,8].

Electrical and instrumentation systems are particularly important because they provide both physical capability and information about that capability. Motor insulation, cable terminations and switchgear are all potential failure points. So are the instruments, calibration chains, and networked controllers. A classifier could misinterpret a temperature probe drifting as a bearing fault. Conversely, filtering that suppresses an odd transient could mask the first indication of an electrical fault. Sensor-based

research warns us not to assume every measurement channel is correct [10], and oilfield digital twin work has highlighted the challenges of integrating heterogeneous technical systems [23].

The literature offers strong techniques but no clear path to reliable decision-making. Motor-specific work reports pattern-recognition performance under highly controlled conditions [13,16], whereas oilfield equipment work focuses on historical operating patterns [14]. Risk-based maintenance, by contrast, asks which failures matter, how quickly their consequences can unfold, and what level of evidence is required before you act [25]. A useful academic framework therefore must incorporate equipment criticality, design and installation quality, diagnostic validity, work execution, and feedback. This paper reviews that integration, without of course taking the published benchmark scores as indicative of any demonstrated smart oilfield safety performance.

2 Aim of the study

The study presents an evidence-based, auditable approach to linking risk-based quality assurance with predictive fault detection for the electrical and instrumentation assets in a smart oilfield. It's a decision architecture rather than an experimentally validated fault detection algorithm. It identifies where the existing body of work supports the practice, where the practice needs to be modified in the context and where independent safety measures are still required.

3 Research objectives

- **Objective 1:** Establish a failure mode and consequences taxonomy for power distribution, motors, instrument loops, and control interfaces to distinguish between equipment degradation and evidence corruption.
- **Objective 2:** Compare physical, statistical, machine learning and hybrid diagnostic strategies about signal requirements, interpretability, operating variability and deployment constraints.
- **Objective 3:** Define the assurance gates that link engineering inspection records, measurement reliability, model validation, and authorised maintenance action.
- **Objective 4:** Assess outstanding issues related to cross-site transfer, uncertain alarms, the very rare occurrence of hazardous faults, and the separation of predictive monitoring from protective functions.
- **Objective 5:** Define the research priorities (and associated implementation responsibilities) for the operator, engineering contractor, vendors, and asset assurance teams.

4 Research questions

- **RQ1:** What are the most significant electrical and instrumentation failure modes for reliable smart oilfield operation, and what observable characteristics differentiate them?
- **RQ2:** Under what evidence and operating conditions do the predictive techniques generate trustworthy, actionable warnings rather than just apparently accurate classifications?
- **RQ3:** How can QA processes turn model outputs into risk-proportionate inspection and maintenance without compromising independent protection?
- **RQ4:** What evaluation design and governance practices are required to deliver sustained value across oilfield sites, equipment generations and operating regimes?

5 Review methodology

We used a structured integrative review approach because the relevant body of knowledge spans petroleum engineering, electrical machinery, process instrumentation, reliability, maintenance management, and AI. This contrasts with a more traditional effectiveness review, which would have collected only studies with a similar design. The integrative review allows comparison across study designs and helps establish causal and organisational boundaries. The search strategy was applied across Scopus, Web of Science Core Collection, IEEE Xplore, ScienceDirect, SpringerLink, and several other publisher databases, with candidate studies also identified through backward citation. The search terms were a combination of 'oilfield' or 'oil and gas' or 'subsea' with 'electrical fault', 'instrumentation', 'sensor fault', 'predictive maintenance', 'condition monitoring', 'risk-based inspection', 'digital twin' and 'quality assurance'. We also reviewed adjacent work on motors and industrial systems, which provided useful insight into underlying mechanisms not covered in the field work publications.

Target publication window: 2020-2025 with an emphasis on empirical and review papers relating to identifiable diagnostic techniques, assets or implementation issues. We required peer-reviewed journal or conference papers and a genuine scholarly record with substantial information on the methods, assumptions, and/or implications. We excluded purely marketing material, model announcements without supporting evidence, studies on civil infrastructure that weren't directly relevant, and duplicates. Papers from adjacent domains were only included if they provided explicitly indirect evidence. The final curated bibliography consists of thirty source-verified peer-reviewed papers. It is not presented as the output of a full reproducible database export, and we report no unverified identifications, exclusions or screening counts.

Screening started with title and abstract relevance, then moved to full-text or publisher record assessment where possible. The assessment considered the clarity of the asset definition, the provenance of the sensor data, the reproducibility of the experimental splits, the specificity of the fault labels, the appropriateness of the baselines, the level of uncertainty reported, and the explicitness of the limitations. Field validation and operational realism were more important than good laboratory accuracy. Review papers were assessed on the transparency of their scope and the quality of their synthesis, rather than as primary performance evidence. A source-by-claim extraction matrix captured the context, fault mechanism, input signals, analytic family, reported benefits, and limitations. The evidence was then thematically coded into risk prioritisation, electrical signatures, instrument trust, data integration, decision governance and validation.

Synthesis relied on critical appraisal rather than statistical pooling, as outcomes, denominators, and definitions of failure vary significantly across publications. Any statements regarding plausible application in the oilfield are clearly distinguished from actual deployment outcomes. This approach will enable a defensible conceptual framework. Still, it will not permit the calculation of a pooled effect size, a global failure rate, or a global maintenance savings figure. The database strategy and eligibility criteria are fully described for transparency. A formal prospective protocol and an independently reproducible search log would be required before this manuscript could be described as a completed PRISMA systematic review [3,11].

Methodological reproducibility also hinges on how precisely you describe the analytic contrasts. The simulated short circuit study was coded as experimental electrical evidence rather than field validation. The oilfield installation study was coded as contextual evidence even though the prediction metric it reported was in fact a stronger one. Overlapping review articles were not treated

as separate instances of demonstration of model performance. This avoids the common trap of citing multiple secondary syntheses as if each independently validated a single empirical result. Given the transdisciplinary nature of the topic, relevance decisions necessarily relied on judgement. An extraction matrix would have been useful to submit, as it would have improved reproducibility and allowed independent reclassification.

6 Thematic literature review and critical analysis

6.1 Risk classification and the QA boundary

Traditional inspection records give you proof of conformity at a point in time. Reliability assurance is about whether a function can meet its operational requirements over time. A risk-based approach considers the probability of failure and the consequences to health and safety, the environment, and production. Petroleum maintenance research groups have looked at optimisation strategies in the context of equipment criticality and the tools available to them [7]. More recent multi-case work has argued that risk models should respond to actual digital operating conditions rather than remain a static maintenance register [25]. That distinction is vital in the context of a smart oilfield, as it means you don't end up with a relatively low-cost sensor fault being given higher priority than a potentially catastrophic protective loop fault simply because the sensor fault generates more alerts.

A good criticality assessment starts with asset function, plausible failure mode, detectability and consequence pathway. Excessive motor current is a classic example of a parameter that may indicate process loading rather than winding damage. An incorrectly set up protective relay may be completely undetectable during normal operation. QA should review the cable certs, insulation tests, earth continuity, instrument range, calibration records, loop checks, alarm rationalisation, and change authorisation as supporting evidence. Dynamic inspection in the petrochemical industry is a good example of the principle that operating windows and risk plans are inter-related [26] - it's just that its focus is on static equipment. Hence, it's not really applicable to the electrical protection logic.

6.2 Electrical asset fault signatures

Motors and drives generate electrical current, voltage and vibration signals which can all be used in a variety of complementary diagnostic techniques. Published work comparing the performance of support vector machines, neural networks and boosting techniques has demonstrated the range of approaches available for motor condition monitoring [13]. Model-informed neural approaches have been developed which aim to maintain physical sensitivity whilst allowing for equipment variation [15]. Dilated convolutional architectures have been shown to be capable of capturing multiscale vibration signatures [16]. The difficulty of interpreting the features learned in the presence of field noise is, however, still a significant issue. The work cited does demonstrate the potential for fault discrimination. It does not, however, guarantee that reliable warnings can be provided in the harsh offshore environment with all its attendant problems of humidity, variable loads and mixed equipment.

Inter-turn faults, broken rotor bars and supply asymmetry are particularly relevant, as the operating conditions can mask the signatures of the fault. Start-up transient analysis can be used to detect winding degradation via wavelet representations [17]. Hilbert and wavelet transforms can be used to provide alternative rotor fault features [18]. Current phasor and fuzzy methods are both quite clear in terms of diagnostic route [19]. All of these techniques, of course, are predicated on good sampling,

the right bandwidth, a good phase reference and operating state data. Research into small motor condition monitoring [20] cannot be taken as being applicable to the high-power oilfield drives. Limited label cross-load learning [21] is an example of a transfer approach but again highlights the need to demonstrate how the model performs under unseen loads.

6.3 Instrument trust and process context

Pressure, level, flow, temperature and vibration channels are all imperfect observations of the actual state of health of the asset. Drift, plugging, impulse line blockage, wiring corrosion, grounding faults and communication loss can all give rise to a signal that looks like a process upset. Sensor fault reviews show that detection can require redundant measurements, structural models or temporal consistency checks [10]. Multivariate anomaly detection at oil and gas stations makes use of digital twin concepts combined with learned sequence relationships [24] and is a far more relevant industrial benchmark than the single motor case. The caveat, of course, is that correlated channels can fail at the same time as a result of a common electrical disturbance, and an anomaly score by itself is unlikely to tell you which device to go and fix.

The diagnostic vs protective system distinction is absolutely fundamental. Predictive analytics may well tell you a transmitter needs calibrating, but it mustn't in any way silently replace a safety instrumented function or change a trip setpoint. Measurement validation therefore requires independent evidence in the form of portable calibration, redundant process measurements and event timestamps. If a model is generating a persistent alarm that maintenance can't validate, then the correct outcome is to trigger an investigation rather than simply suppress the alarm. That's the only way to properly respect the asymmetry between nuisance alarms and missed dangerous failures.

6.4 Oilfield-specific predictive evidence

Ensemble learning applied to field equipment reports good classification results from the operational history [14]. It is clearly more relevant to the field than to the lab, given real-world variability and sector-specific failure labels. The potential for overgeneralisation remains due to shared training environments, maintenance record bias, and the ever-changing nature of the asset population. Work on electric submersible screw pumps combines residual neural features with synthetic minority examples and ensemble classification [27]. The reported performance is, of course, highly relevant to that particular asset and dataset. It cannot be taken as predictive of switchgear or field instrumentation reliability. The work on pipeline failure and leak detection [1,4,6] is important. Still, it examines a very different degradation mechanism and is valuable for risk framing rather than as a substitute for E&I validation.

Big data reviews of downhole problems and pipeline integrity highlight the sheer volume of data available coupled with the difficult issue of contextual interpretation [8,9]. A monitoring architecture which combines supervisory control data with failure work orders can improve the causal plausibility. A replacement record is not necessarily indicative of an impending failure, though. Planned outages, inspection programmes and vendor upgrades will all change the labels independently of any actual deterioration. If the maintenance events aren't explicitly annotated, then the algorithm will learn the organisation's maintenance schedule rather than the physics of the equipment. That's a fundamental assurance risk as it's entirely possible to get very convincing retrospective results with very little prospective warning time..

6.5 Digital twins and data interoperability

Digital twins are often described as continuous representations of the physical asset, but actual implementations vary widely, from simple visualisation dashboards through to fully bidirectionally updated analytical models. The oil and gas twin literature is replete with discussion of the actual technologies and the degree of architectural fragmentation that exists under the 'digital twin' heading [23]. Significant work in the distributed industrial twin space focuses on edge- and fog-based pathways to predictive maintenance [12]. These are particularly attractive in the context of remote well sites where connectivity is poor or intermittent. In practice though the availability of the underlying infrastructure, the ability to achieve clock synchronisation and the presence of adequate cyber controls will all be key factors in determining whether the reconstructed state of the asset is credible. A digital twin should therefore be evaluated on the basis of its validated functions and data lineage rather than on the basis of the existence of a 3D display.

At the very least the proposed E&I representation should incorporate equipment identifiers, wiring or loop relationships, approved design settings, calibration history, time series data and maintenance actions. Configuration changes must be traceable across the engineering and operational systems. The provenance work clearly demonstrates that a record of transformation enables accountability in the context of predictive maintenance [28]. The visual analytics work also serves to highlight the importance of human interpretation in the operational decision making process [22]. Neither paper demonstrates that a particular dashboard would prevent an oilfield failure. Together they do, however form a very solid basis for the requirement that traceability, appropriate context and reviewable evidence should be the acceptance criteria.

6.6 Maintenance decision design

The value of the predictive signals is only realised if they are linked to inspection opportunity, spares, plant access and authorisation. Reliability-based subsea control maintenance research focuses on integrating the reliability of complex control components with the scheduling of interventions [29]. Sequential inspection research using reinforcement learning looks at decision making under uncertainty [30] but the infrastructure context doesn't necessarily mean that it's a ready solution for the oilfield. The appropriate decision unit is an actionable work recommendation with uncertainty, potential consequences, a confirmatory test and an expiry time rather than just a binary classifier output.




Figure 1. Consequence-sensitive assurance architecture; predictive analytics does not replace the protection systems.

A decision policy must tell the difference between routine, urgent, and safety-critical findings. Routine deviations would trigger a trend review; urgent anomalies would trigger a targeted condition check; any suspected loss of a protective barrier would trigger the established escalation procedures regardless of the predicted probability. Figure 1 shows the mapping of these layers to engineering evidence and independent safety governance. The principle is to route the predictive recommendations through human review and site operating rules so that the algorithm doesn't become an unauthorised controller.

6.7 Installation quality and latent defects

Predictive analysis can't go back and fix poor commissioning provenance. There is a very important distinction between an installation defect and in-service degradation, as the implications for intervention responsibility, for preventing recurrence, and for warranty are very different. A loose electrical termination might give rise to intermittent heating as the load cycles. A wrongly ranged instrument may be perfectly stable but simply wrong over its entire operating range. The QA plan must therefore record the time-stamped inspection findings and the evidence of corrective closeout (including the approved configuration). The models must record those state changes as explicit events rather than assume that the equipment is in a 'known good' state after maintenance.

6.8 Alarm quality and diagnostic economics

An oilfield operator could be looking at hundreds of low confidence alarms across a range of assets. A defensible alarm policy from an academic point of view would involve estimating the maintenance resources each alarm level consumes and the cost of delayed confirmation. Alarm clustering can be used to suppress the effect of several different symptoms from a single power disturbance (as long as the original evidence is still available). When reviewing false alarms you need to ask whether it was the model, the data stream or the engineering baseline that was at fault. That turns a general complaint about the quality of the prediction into a specific action to improve.

6.9 Failure dependencies across boundaries

What looks like a single component failure is frequently in fact a failure further upstream or downstream. Recurrent motor overheating can be due to process restrictions, an unbalanced supply or inadequate cooling. An erratic valve position can be the result of poor instrument air, actuator problems or feedback wiring. An isolated asset classifier may well identify the symptom correctly but get the repair wrong. A systems approach to diagnosis therefore involves looking at the functional dependencies and checking the likely common causes before authorising any intervention. This requires an asset graph which will link the electrical supply, the process duty, the instrument signals and the maintenance history, whilst still making the distinction between a correlation and a causation, maintaining that clear distinction.

7 Discussion

The synthesis points to a fundamental imbalance between algorithmic innovation and system level assurance. The motor literature is replete with transformations, classifiers and cross validation [13,15-21]. The petroleum operations literature is full of organisational constraints, consequence modelling and mixed asset dependencies [7,14,25]. The two are only beneficial when the fault semantics align: the bearing label in the lab must map to a maintenance action in the oilfield with a credible warning time, a manageable false-alarm burden, and a consequence assessment. A classifier

that has been tuned for overall accuracy may be very poor on a rare, severe fault as the normal state records will dominate the denominator. A second issue is that of sensor quantity versus evidential reliability. More channels may be better in terms of observability but only if you have proper synchronisation, calibration and operating context. Redundant sensors can be susceptible to the same vulnerabilities and a single failing data interface can give rise to a whole raft of false anomalies across the field at the same time. QA therefore cannot be confined to procurement and construction acceptance. It has to be a lifecycle activity which will go back and re-assess measurement uncertainty, asset hierarchy, control configuration and model drift as the operating conditions change. Figure 2 shows the evidence chain from detection of deviation through to authorisation of action and learning.




Figure 2. The reviewable evidence cycle from signal acquisition to outcome learning.

Third, the argument for a hybrid is conditional rather than absolute. Physics based signatures provide real constraints and real causes. The flexible ML can pick up interactions which are missing from a much simpler physical model. The hybrid is appealing when the model residuals and the historical data are complementary. It becomes less credible though if both components are being fed the same degraded input. Independent calibration evidence and conservative action limits are more important than the complexity of the model. The various multi-sector predictive maintenance reviews show very different applications and outcomes [2,3,5] which again points to the need to make a case for the specific application rather than to adopt a universal 'best' algorithm. Finally, risk-based assurance should be assessed against a counterfactual workflow. An anomaly detected is of no benefit if a planned inspection would have picked it up at a lower cost, or if the repair results in a higher level of exposure than continuing with monitored operation. The benefit assessment should take into account event lead time, warning precision, maintenance labour, process downtime, protective integrity and the number of repeated nuisance investigations. The outcomes cannot be gleaned from published offline F1 scores alone. The proposed framework treats any improvement in cost or reliability as a hypothesis to be tested in the field via a trial, rather than as an achievement of this review.

Another issue is the assurance of the algorithmic lifecycle. The accepted model is a properly controlled engineering artefact with a well defined input schema, training horizon, validation population and decision scope. A subsequent software update, new instruments or changed production practices could all in effect invalidate the basis of acceptance. Model change control would involve comparing the decisions of the updated model against those of the previous model on a

locked reference dataset and then establishing a period of restricted live observation prior to a wide release. Rollback is of course important as faults can just as easily emerge from the diagnostic infrastructure as from the physical equipment itself. Such controls take quality assurance beyond the construction phase to encompass software configuration and sustained operational fitness.

The framework also changes the definition of what constitutes good quality assurance. Completion of the required inspections is still a prerequisite, but the improved outcome is the ability to reconstruct why an item of equipment was deemed serviceable on a particular date. The reconstruction will incorporate the approved design limits, the validated measurements, the known anomalies, the personnel decisions and the subsequent outcomes. It enables you to learn from both near misses and actual defects. Without that ability to reconstruct you will find it very difficult to audit any apparent improvement in predictive accuracy and the inevitable disputes between operations and maintenance will be about the lack of records rather than about the actual technical evidence.

A critical assessment should also record the negative operational consequences. An alert that results in an unplanned shutdown, an extra inspection or a wrong part being replaced is an indicator of system quality rather than a mere exception to be discarded. Similarly, the timely identification of an instrument fault may well have prevented a process disruption without the monitored motor necessarily having been in a failed state. These distinctions enable a predictive system to be assessed in terms of the quality of the decisions it facilitates, taking into account the level of technical uncertainty, the impact on human workload and the maintenance of independent safety margins. It is only in this way that procedures can be modified without simply equating the volume of alerts with an increased level of asset risk.

8 Research gaps and future research

First, there are very few publicly available longitudinal datasets that link the electrical waveforms, the calibration records, the control changes and the confirmed maintenance diagnoses. Future work should establish consented, anonymised cross asset datasets with failure taxonomies, sensor quality flags, intervention dates and clearly defined observation periods. Training and testing should be separated both in time and by site with documented asset overlap. This would be a test of whether the apparent early warnings are actually valid in a genuinely new production period or whether they are simply exploiting a shared operating regime.

Secondly, we need consequence aware assessment. The models that are published tend to focus on accuracy, recall or error rate. The operator is looking for performance in terms of failure severity and the time available for intervention. Prospective studies should report calibrated failure likelihoods, false alarms per asset month, detection lead time, time to confirmation and the number of high consequence events that are missed. Very rare critical failures will obviously make it very difficult to get a tight statistical estimate and the researchers should be transparent about that rather than pretend they have a precise figure. Simulation and expert elicitation can be used to inform planning but must be clearly distinguished from actual observed field frequencies.

Thirdly, the interaction between sensing faults and equipment faults is largely unexplored. The appropriate experiment would be to inject into a real pipeline calibration drift, phase loss, intermittent network delay, correlated sensor failures and deliberate data corruption. Competing approaches could then be evaluated under the same disturbance sequences. It would be important to assess whether an algorithm is prepared to abstain when its inputs are not trustworthy, whether it

communicates uncertainty in a meaningful way, and whether the site team can establish a physical root cause without having to go to enormous lengths to do so.

Fourthly, deployment research should look at accountable decision interfaces. Multi site comparisons could be used to assess the impact of explainable alerts, structured confirmatory tests and formally signed corrective actions on completion times and safety case traceability. Digital twin evaluations should publish the sync error, data lineage completeness, cybersecurity controls and model update approval records. A key future outcome is not just fewer failures but better evidence to support the decision as to when an intervention is warranted. That will require a real collaboration between the reliability engineers, the instrument people, the data scientists and the operations assurance people.

Fifthly, we should look at the boundary between improved observability and operational security. The remote sensor gateways will give you a lot more diagnostic reach but they will also create new attack surfaces and new configuration dependencies. Your test scenarios should include stale but plausible telemetry, manipulated timestamps and loss of authentication rather than just random missing values. A good maintenance model would be one that would say its evidence is insufficient and would therefore preserve the last known good operating rule. That's a very pertinent research theme for a distributed oilfield where you may well have a local engineer that isn't available to come and look at an ambiguous alert.

Sixth, future comparative work should split detection, diagnosis and prognosis. Detection is simply asking whether the operating behaviour is anomalous. Diagnosis is about identifying a plausible fault mechanism. Prognosis is about estimating how much time is left before some defined intervention threshold is reached. A high detection score in no way constitutes evidence of remaining useful life. The studies should state which of these claims is actually supported by the data and should test the diagnostic specificity against other possible physical causes. This level of clarity would also be of benefit in terms of the quality of cross study comparisons and would prevent maintenance planners from taking a warning as a precise failure forecast.

9 Practical, managerial and policy implications

Operators can start with a finite set of high consequence motors, switchgear, protection relays and instrument loops. The asset owner should have a clear set of functional requirements, a list of credible failure modes, a list of available tests and a list of existing controls prior to selecting the analytics software. Table 1 takes the failure modes and maps them to suggested QA evidence and diagnostic candidates. The priority of each item should be based on operational consequence, plausibility of deterioration and ability to intervene. Instrumentation channels which support safety functions will of course require a very high level of scrutiny regardless of the historical failure count.

Engineering contractors should be handing over structured digital records rather than a disparate collection of test attachments. The records should include asset tag consistency, instrument ranges, cable and termination details, design revisions, calibration tolerances, and loop check results in order to facilitate later fault interpretation. Procurement contracts can, of course, require exportable, machine-readable event records and clear definitions of sensor uncertainty. For the vendor the diagnostic acceptance testing should include operation state shifts, missing channels and tests against known benign disturbances. No model should be accepted on overall classification accuracy alone. Maintenance managers need to be able to distinguish between an alert and an order. An alert is just a hypothesis. An approved work order is the record of an intervention decision having been made on the basis of consequence, confidence and confirmatory evidence. The engineer responsible

should be able to look at the triggering signals, the applicable thresholds and the relevant work history. Table 2 contains the governance checkpoints and testable performance measures. Periodic independent audits should sample the warnings that have been dismissed and the repairs that have been completed in order to detect automation bias, missed faults and systematic labelling errors.

Table 2. Proposed assurance gates and operational validation metrics (author synthesis).

Decision gate	Required evidence	Evaluation measure	Accountable role
Data acceptance	Calibration status; clock alignment; asset tags	Proportion of valid input windows	Instrumentation engineer
Model acceptance	Temporal and site holdout; subgroup results	Lead time, false alerts/asset-month	Reliability and data teams
Action approval	Risk tier; corroborating test; work scope	Confirmed-alert yield; intervention time	Operations / maintenance
Lifecycle audit	Change history; dismissed alerts; outcomes	Drift, retraining exceptions, repeat faults	Asset assurance manager

At the organisation and policy level, the framework provides a clear separation between predictive optimisation and the testing which is required to provide protection under the law or technically. Any reference to standards such as IEC functional safety, electrical installation rules, or local petroleum rules must be checked against the operator's jurisdiction, the plant's classification, and the contractual scope. That review in no way constitutes certification of compliance with any particular standard. Internal policy will need to define access control, retention, change control, incident reporting and what is acceptable as evidence for model retraining. Risk ownership should remain with the accountable engineering functions and not be transferred to a software supplier.

Phased deployment should begin in advisory mode on a small number of assets which are well instrumented and have good traceable fault records. The model can generate recommendations that can be compared against the existing maintenance regime, with no actual process change. In the next phase, confirmed alerts can trigger a reviewed inspection request, which the technician then carries out and records the causal finding. Only once there is operational evidence of reliability, workload and safety can the scope be widened. The technician has to be trained to be able to question the model's assumptions, be able to interpret the current and voltage anomalies and be able to report any anomalies. Performance ownership has to be shared: reliability will have the consequences, instrument engineering will have the measurement validation, and the data team will have the analytic reproducibility.

10 Limitations

This is an integrative review in the strictest sense (not an original field experiment, not a quantified systematic meta-analysis). The 30-item evidence base has been selected with a view to providing a broad spread of both topical and methodological coverage. It by no means purports to characterise the volume of work that has been published or to state that no contrary studies exist. There may be an under-representation of negative results and of local operational experience due to the nature of publication and the fact that we have only included English language work. A number of the electrical diagnostic studies are based on test rigs and small motors, and the requirements for oilfield protection and hazardous area instrumentation are very different. The recommendations are

therefore in the form of concepts and will need to be subjected to engineering verification in the particular context prior to any actual application.

Furthermore, publisher records will give you the bibliographic details but won't in any way independently validate the experimental results or claims made in the individual papers. You're very limited in your ability to make direct comparisons between studies due to the fact that the definitions of equipment failure, the maintenance benefit and the observation period are all different. There is no causal claim that the adoption of the framework will lead to any particular reduction in downtime or risk. Those outcomes would require prospective, controlled operational evaluation with audited baselines.

11 Conclusion

Risk based quality assurance and predictive fault detection should be viewed as a single assurance system rather than as two separate inspection and data science projects. Electrical assets need to have physically meaningful signatures and instrumentation needs to be checked on the infthat the signatures are on based upon. There is research into a wide variety of motor diagnostics, field oriented ensemble methods and digital infrastructure but no research has established a single transferable model for smart oilfields. The most defensible approach is to use consequence based asset selection, verified engineering data, contextual anomaly analysis, uncertainty aware escalation and independent protection governance. The key contribution of that approach is the sequence of auditable decisions that go from an abnormal signal to the authorisation of maintenance. Field studies should now be looking at that sequence against realistic operational baselines with a clear eye on the rare critical failure, sensor trust and the actual measured value of the intervention.

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