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Assessment of the Role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in The United States of America (USA)
Subject area: Management and Commerce · Area of research: Financial Crime
Abstract
This paper presents a discussion on the Central Intelligence Agency?s (CIA) role in the terrorist attack of September 11 in the USA, the historical modes of its development, its structural capacities, and its failure in intelligence. This paper begins its presentation of the history of the formation and the development of the CIA by giving a background of this formation and evolutionary process, giving its major attention to the manner of its evolution during the Cold War, as well as after the tragedy of 9/11. The article elaborates three research questions that address the issue of intelligence failures and interagency cooperation, as well as covert operations following 9/11. The documentary research papers provide empirical data of a synopsis of structural setbacks, bureaucratic competitions, and obscurity that disabled the right intelligence activity before 9/11. A qualitative method of documentary analysis was employed. Findings point to the significant institutional transformations in transparency efforts and diplomacy in intelligence, as well as policy realignment imminent as a result of 9/11. The additional areas covered in this research paper include further incorporation between the agencies, an increase in transparency in activities, and more empirical studies to be done on the subject matter of intelligence community reform. It gives necessary facts to the scholars, policy makers and smart practitioners regarding the adaptive capability of CIA in the international security system.
References
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[4] Hulnick, A. S. (1999). Chapter 4: Secret Operations. In Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century. Praeger Security International.
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How to cite this paper
@article{1709828,
author = {Vitalis Mdoe, Esq.},
title = {Assessment of the Role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in The United States of America (USA)},
journal = {Iconic Research And Engineering Journals},
year = {2025},
volume = {9},
number = {1},
pages = {1288-1296},
issn = {2456-8880},
url = {https://www.irejournals.com/formatedpaper/1709828.pdf},
abstract = {This paper presents a discussion on the Central Intelligence Agency?s (CIA) role in the terrorist attack of September 11 in the USA, the historical modes of its development, its structural capacities, and its failure in intelligence. This paper begins its presentation of the history of the formation and the development of the CIA by giving a background of this formation and evolutionary process, giving its major attention to the manner of its evolution during the Cold War, as well as after the tragedy of 9/11. The article elaborates three research questions that address the issue of intelligence failures and interagency cooperation, as well as covert operations following 9/11. The documentary research papers provide empirical data of a synopsis of structural setbacks, bureaucratic competitions, and obscurity that disabled the right intelligence activity before 9/11. A qualitative method of documentary analysis was employed. Findings point to the significant institutional transformations in transparency efforts and diplomacy in intelligence, as well as policy realignment imminent as a result of 9/11. The additional areas covered in this research paper include further incorporation between the agencies, an increase in transparency in activities, and more empirical studies to be done on the subject matter of intelligence community reform. It gives necessary facts to the scholars, policy makers and smart practitioners regarding the adaptive capability of CIA in the international security system.},
month = {July},
}