Home / Current Issue / Paper 1717132
The Illusion of Autonomy: How Institutional Overlaps Undermine Land Security in Nigeria’s Petroleum Special Economic Zones
Subject area: Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities · Area of research: Public Policy Analysis
DOI: https://doi.org/10.64388/IREV9I10-1717132
Abstract
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are often lauded for their “regulatory autonomy” or specifically, the ability to operate outside national bureaucratic constraints. Yet in Nigeria’s Petroleum SEZs referred to as Oil and Gas Free Zones (OGFZs), this autonomy remains largely illusory due to persistent institutional overlaps between federal agencies and state governments over land and other governance issues in the Zones. This article analyzes how jurisdictional conflicts between the Oil and Gas Free Zones Authority (OGFZA), Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) and State land authorities have created a “governance vacuum” that undermines land security, deters investment, and fueled community discontent between 2015 and 2025. Using process-tracing and stakeholder interviews across eight OGFZs, the study identifies three conflict archetypes: (1) Port-Zone Duality, where NPA and OGFZA operate contradictory land use regulations; (2) Federal-State Pressure, where state governors’ control over OGFZ land contest federal designation; and (3) Local-Developer Disputes, where communities challenge land acquisitions for lacking free, prior, and informed consent. The research introduces the “Institutional Overlap Index” (IOI) to quantify jurisdictional fragmentation and finds a strong negative correlation (r = -0.79) between IOI scores and investor confidence. The study concludes that Nigeria’s OGFZs cannot achieve their economic potential without statutory reforms that clarify land ownership, cede administrative control to OGFZA, and establish multi-level governance forums for conflict resolution.
Keywords
Institutional Overlap, Land Security, Regulatory Autonomy, Special Economic Zones, Nigeria
References
[1] Akinola, A. O., Adegbite, E. O., & Ojo, J. S. (2024). Special economic zones, institutional efficiency and development outcomes in Nigeria. Journal of Public Policy and Development Studies, 18 (1), 22–41.
[2] Birner, R. (2011). Challenges of land governance in Nigeria: Case study evidence from Ondo State (IFPRI Working Paper No. 01089). International Food Policy Research Institute.
[3] Braithwaite, J. (2008). Regulatory capitalism: How it works, ideas for making it work better . Edward Elgar Publishing.
[4] Deininger, K., Selassie, A. G., & Sethi, T. (2011). Securing land rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: The role of technology (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5875). World Bank.
[5] Farole, T. (2011). Special economic zones in Africa: Comparing performance and learning from global experience . World Bank Publications.
[6] Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). (2010). Land governance assessment framework: An analytical tool for policy makers . FAO.
[7] Gunningham, N., Kagan, R. A., & Thornton, D. (2004). Social license and environmental protection: Why businesses go beyond compliance. Law & Social Inquiry, 29 (2), 307–341. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2004.tb00338.x
[8] Levi-Faur, D. (Ed.). (2014). Handbook on the politics of regulation . Edward Elgar Publishing.
[9] Mabogunje, A. L. (2009). Land management in Nigeria: Issues, opportunities, and threats . Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER).
[10] Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of Management Review, 22 (4), 853–886. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1997.9711022105
[11] North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance . Cambridge University Press.
[12] Nzerem C., Obe O (2015). A review of Nigeria’s free trade zone scheme. Lagos, Nigeria Kachifo Limited
[13] Odumosu, O., Olawale, F., & Akinyemi, B. (2020). Land tenure insecurity and property disputes in Southwestern Nigeria: A stakeholder analysis. African Journal of Land Policy and Geospatial Sciences, 3 (2), 112–129.
[14] Ostrom, E. (2010). Beyond markets and states: Polycentric governance of complex economic systems. American Economic Review, 100 (3), 641–672. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.3.641
[15] Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A. (1973). Implementation: How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland; or, why it’s amazing that federal programs work at all . University of California Press.
[16] Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of Management Review, 20 (3), 571–610. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1995.9508080331
[17] Ugonabo, A., Udeh, S., & Eze, C. (2023). Land policy and effective land administration in Nigeria: Prospects and challenges. Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy, 14 (1), 55–74.
[18] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (2019). World investment report 2019: Special economic zones . United Nations Publications.
[19] Vaia, L. (2024). Legal frameworks and regulatory enforcement in land use planning. Journal of Urban Law and Policy, 12 (2), 88–105.
[20] World Bank. (2011). Special economic zones: Performance, lessons learned, and implications for zone development . World Bank Group.
[21] World Bank. (2022). Leveraging technology for land administration: Global experiences . World Bank Group.
[22] Zeng, D. Z. (2016). Global experiences with special economic zones: Focus on China and Africa. World Bank Research Observer, 31 (2), 211–238. https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/lkw003
How to cite this paper
@article{1717132,
author = {Prof. Abdullahi Yahaya Adadu, Assoc. Prof Canice E. Erunke, Morgan Uzoigwe C. Mmahi},
title = {The Illusion of Autonomy: How Institutional Overlaps Undermine Land Security in Nigeria’s Petroleum Special Economic Zones},
journal = {Iconic Research And Engineering Journals},
year = {2026},
volume = {9},
number = {10},
pages = {3900-3909},
issn = {2456-8880},
url = {https://www.irejournals.com/formatedpaper/1717132.pdf},
abstract = {Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are often lauded for their “regulatory autonomy” or specifically, the ability to operate outside national bureaucratic constraints. Yet in Nigeria’s Petroleum SEZs referred to as Oil and Gas Free Zones (OGFZs), this autonomy remains largely illusory due to persistent institutional overlaps between federal agencies and state governments over land and other governance issues in the Zones. This article analyzes how jurisdictional conflicts between the Oil and Gas Free Zones Authority (OGFZA), Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) and State land authorities have created a “governance vacuum” that undermines land security, deters investment, and fueled community discontent between 2015 and 2025. Using process-tracing and stakeholder interviews across eight OGFZs, the study identifies three conflict archetypes: (1) Port-Zone Duality, where NPA and OGFZA operate contradictory land use regulations; (2) Federal-State Pressure, where state governors’ control over OGFZ land contest federal designation; and (3) Local-Developer Disputes, where communities challenge land acquisitions for lacking free, prior, and informed consent. The research introduces the “Institutional Overlap Index” (IOI) to quantify jurisdictional fragmentation and finds a strong negative correlation (r = -0.79) between IOI scores and investor confidence. The study concludes that Nigeria’s OGFZs cannot achieve their economic potential without statutory reforms that clarify land ownership, cede administrative control to OGFZA, and establish multi-level governance forums for conflict resolution.},
keywords = {Institutional Overlap, Land Security, Regulatory Autonomy, Special Economic Zones, Nigeria},
month = {April},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.64388/IREV9I10-1717132}
}