A Framework for Operational Integrity in High-Risk Drilling: Balancing Productivity and Safety Compliance

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@article{1717207,
      author = {Chinelo Vivian Nwangwu, Omolara Atarhe Duvbiama-Owasanoye, Alexander Onwumere},
      title = {A Framework for Operational Integrity in High-Risk Drilling: Balancing Productivity and Safety Compliance},
      journal = {Iconic Research And Engineering Journals},
      year = {2018},
      volume = {2},
      number = {5},
      pages = {436-453},
      issn = {2456-8880},
      url = {https://www.irejournals.com/formatedpaper/1717207.pdf},
      abstract = {High-risk drilling operations sit at the intersection of two organizational demands that have grown increasingly difficult to reconcile in the modern upstream petroleum sector. On one hand, operators and contractors must deliver wells on accelerated schedules and within tight capital envelopes in order to remain competitive across onshore, shallow-water, and deepwater settings. On the other hand, the catastrophic potential of well control incidents, blowouts, and process safety failures imposes a non-negotiable imperative for rigorous safety compliance and barrier integrity. This review develops a conceptual framework for operational integrity that treats productivity and safety not as competing priorities to be traded against one another, but as interdependent outcomes of shared underlying organizational and engineering capabilities. Drawing on high-reliability organizing theory, barrier management thinking, resilience engineering, and the process safety literature that emerged from Piper Alpha, Texas City, and Macondo, the framework is organized around four mutually reinforcing pillars: technical barrier integrity, competence-based human performance, compliance-as-learning, and integrated decision governance. Each pillar is examined in terms of its conceptual foundations, its translation into drilling-specific practices, and its contribution to sustained operational performance under production pressure. The framework is intended to help drilling organizations move beyond binary productivity-versus-safety thinking and toward a more mature integrity posture in which throughput and safety outcomes co-evolve. The discussion also identifies boundary conditions, limitations of existing evidence, and priorities for future conceptual and empirical work.},
      keywords = {Operational Integrity, High-Risk Drilling, Process Safety, Barrier Management, High-Reliability Organizing, Compliance, Productivity, Resilience Engineering, Upstream Petroleum, Well Control.},
      month = {November},
  }