IsoBFT: A Novel Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Consensus Algorithm for Ultra-Low-Latency Decentralized Networks in Critical Infrastructure and Industrial IoT

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@article{1720196,
      author = {Hassan Cessi Ibrahim, Damilare Timothy Ogunjobi, Philip Mensah},
      title = {IsoBFT: A Novel Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Consensus Algorithm for Ultra-Low-Latency Decentralized Networks in Critical Infrastructure and Industrial IoT},
      journal = {Iconic Research And Engineering Journals},
      year = {2026},
      volume = {10},
      number = {1},
      pages = {3591-3615},
      issn = {2456-8880},
      url = {https://www.irejournals.com/formatedpaper/1720196.pdf},
      abstract = {The networks that run operational technology (OT) substations, water treatment plants, oil and gas pipelines, and manufacturing lines are moving from a centralized control to a federated, multi-stakeholder architecture coordinated by permissioned distributed ledgers. Protection and control loops in the electrical grid and other critical infrastructure have protection-relay tripping times, IEC 61850 GOOSE message classes, and SCADA/PMU polling cycles that impose multi-millisecond to sub-second deadlines on protection and control operations, while Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols like PBFT, Tendermint, HotStuff, and HoneyBadgerBFT were designed for settlement workloads that can tolerate hundreds of milliseconds to seconds of latency. In this paper, we survey four representative BFT families, discuss their structural latency and scalability constraints for OT deployment, and introduce a hybrid consensus algorithm called IsoBFT (Isochronous Byzantine Fault Tolerance), which combines an optimistic single-round-trip fast path with a PBFT-style fallback mechanism based on a network-stability monitor, and elects a small rotating committee using a verifiable random function (VRF). A formal system model, safety/liveness/termination proof, and security analysis for eight attack classes are provided, with a proposition quantifying the degradation of the practical availability of the safety guarantee when the global Byzantine fraction is approaching one-third. Using realistic Modbus/DNP3/IEC 61850 OT traffic, the discrete-event simulation of the design IsoBFT managed to execute realistic workloads with median consensus latency ranging from 4.90ms at n = 10-50 to 9.17-11.26ms at n = 100 and n = 500, remaining competitive with or better than PBFT and Tendermint across this range. Committee-bounded communication overhead stayed essentially flat with respect to the number of validators from n = 10 to n = 50, but newly completed runs at n = 100 and n = 500 (n = 200 still outstanding) show overhead growing faster than the quadratic scaling of PBFT and Tendermint over that range, together with a heavy P95/P99 latency tail not present at smaller scale; this discrepancy with the theoretical scale-independence result is reported and discussed rather than resolved. IsoBFT could reduce the median latency by approximately 81% and 56% under up to 33% Byzantine faults compared to HotStuff and HoneyBadgerBFT, respectively, at n = 10-50, while maintaining the safety of the system; a Byzantine-resilience sweep at n = 100 shows a narrower advantage over PBFT/Tendermint than at smaller scale.},
      keywords = {Byzantine Fault Tolerance, Consensus Algorithms, Critical Infrastructure, Industrial Internet Of Things, Operational Technology.},
      month = {July},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.64388/IREV10I1-1720196}
  }