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Formal Separation and Practical Concentration: Re-examining the Doctrine of Separation of Powers in the Indian Constitutional Order
Subject area: Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities · Area of research: Law
DOI: 10.64388/IREV10I2-1722477
Abstract
The doctrine of separation of powers is conventionally treated as a foundational safeguard of constitutional democracy, dividing governmental authority among the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary so that no single institution may dominate the others unchecked. This paper examines whether that doctrine operates as a substantive constraint on power in India or whether it survives chiefly as a textual and symbolic arrangement while practical authority concentrates within the political executive. Drawing on constitutional text, landmark judicial pronouncements, and recurring patterns of institutional practice, the paper argues that India's constitutional design deliberately departs from the rigid tripartite model associated with classical separation-of-powers theory, opting instead for a system of distributed but overlapping authority suited to parliamentary government. It further argues that this design, while resilient in form, has proved vulnerable in operation: executive control of the legislative agenda, strict party discipline reinforced by anti-defection law, routine recourse to ordinances and delegated legislation, contested judicial appointments, tribunal dependence on the executive, and the politicisation of the permanent civil service have together produced a pattern of formal separation coexisting with practical concentration. The paper concludes that separation of powers in India is best understood not as an illusion in existence but as an illusion in operation: a framework whose institutional promise depends less on constitutional text, which is already substantial, and more on political restraint, procedural integrity, and public vigilance.
Keywords
separation of powers, Indian Constitution, basic structure doctrine, executive dominance, anti-defection law, judicial review, administrative neutrality, constitutional morality
References
[1] Austin, G. (1966). The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation. Oxford University Press.
[2] Barendt, E. (1995). Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government. Public Law, 599.
[3] Basu, D. D. (2018). Introduction to the Constitution of India. LexisNexis.
[4] Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985.
[5] Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.
[6] Constitution of India, arts. 123, 213, 368.
[7] D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 378.
[8] Dicey, A. V. (1885/2013). Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. Cambridge University Press.
[9] I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.
[10] Jain, M. P. (2014). Indian Constitutional Law. LexisNexis.
[11] Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
[12] Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651.
[13] Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. Crown.
[14] Locke, J. (1689/1988). Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge University Press.
[15] Montesquieu, C. de S., Baron de. (1748/1989). The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge University Press.
[16] Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845.
[17] Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458.
[18] Vile, M. J. C. (1998). Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers. Liberty Fund.
[19] Waldron, J. (2013). Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice? Boston College Law Review, 54(2), 433.
How to cite this paper
@article{1722477,
author = {Nikshepavith A G},
title = {Formal Separation and Practical Concentration: Re-examining the Doctrine of Separation of Powers in the Indian Constitutional Order},
journal = {Iconic Research And Engineering Journals},
year = {2026},
volume = {10},
number = {2},
pages = {2530-2537},
issn = {2456-8880},
url = {https://www.irejournals.com/formatedpaper/1722477.pdf},
abstract = {The doctrine of separation of powers is conventionally treated as a foundational safeguard of constitutional democracy, dividing governmental authority among the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary so that no single institution may dominate the others unchecked. This paper examines whether that doctrine operates as a substantive constraint on power in India or whether it survives chiefly as a textual and symbolic arrangement while practical authority concentrates within the political executive. Drawing on constitutional text, landmark judicial pronouncements, and recurring patterns of institutional practice, the paper argues that India's constitutional design deliberately departs from the rigid tripartite model associated with classical separation-of-powers theory, opting instead for a system of distributed but overlapping authority suited to parliamentary government. It further argues that this design, while resilient in form, has proved vulnerable in operation: executive control of the legislative agenda, strict party discipline reinforced by anti-defection law, routine recourse to ordinances and delegated legislation, contested judicial appointments, tribunal dependence on the executive, and the politicisation of the permanent civil service have together produced a pattern of formal separation coexisting with practical concentration. The paper concludes that separation of powers in India is best understood not as an illusion in existence but as an illusion in operation: a framework whose institutional promise depends less on constitutional text, which is already substantial, and more on political restraint, procedural integrity, and public vigilance.},
keywords = {separation of powers, Indian Constitution, basic structure doctrine, executive dominance, anti-defection law, judicial review, administrative neutrality, constitutional morality},
month = {August},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.64388/IREV10I2-1722477}
}