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Corporate Governance and Firm Value in BRICS: A Cross-Country Analysis of Board Structure, Ownership, and ESG Practices
Subject area: Management and Commerce · Area of research: Corporate Governance and Firm Value
DOI: 10.64388/IREV10I4-1723597
Abstract
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance and firm value across the BRICS economies Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa using a sample of 46 large-cap listed firms. We construct a composite Corporate Governance Index (CGI) incorporating board structure, ownership concentration, CEO duality, female director representation, and ESG scores. Our cross-sectional analysis reveals substantial cross-country heterogeneity in governance quality: South Africa and China exhibit the highest mean CGI scores (72.4), while Brazil and India lag behind (57.4 and 60.6, respectively). We document a positive relationship between CGI and Tobin’s Q, but this relationship is contingent on ownership structure and institutional context. Importantly, SOEs are associated with higher CGI scores but lower market valuations, which suggests that formal governance mechanisms may be used to serve political objectives rather than maximizing firm value. We further find that ESG scores complement rather than substitute for traditional governance metrics in predicting firm value. Our findings demonstrate that governance effectiveness is institutionally embedded and reforms cannot be transplanted from developed markets without accounting for local institutional contexts.
Keywords
Corporate governance, BRICS, firm value, Tobin’s Q, board independence, ownership concentration, ESG, state ownership, emerging markets
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How to cite this paper
@article{1723597,
author = {Mustapha Mustapha Bunu},
title = {Corporate Governance and Firm Value in BRICS: A Cross-Country Analysis of Board Structure, Ownership, and ESG Practices},
journal = {Iconic Research And Engineering Journals},
year = {2026},
volume = {10},
number = {4},
pages = {220-227},
issn = {2456-8880},
url = {https://www.irejournals.com/formatedpaper/1723597.pdf},
abstract = {This study examines the relationship between corporate governance and firm value across the BRICS economies Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa using a sample of 46 large-cap listed firms. We construct a composite Corporate Governance Index (CGI) incorporating board structure, ownership concentration, CEO duality, female director representation, and ESG scores. Our cross-sectional analysis reveals substantial cross-country heterogeneity in governance quality: South Africa and China exhibit the highest mean CGI scores (72.4), while Brazil and India lag behind (57.4 and 60.6, respectively). We document a positive relationship between CGI and Tobin’s Q, but this relationship is contingent on ownership structure and institutional context. Importantly, SOEs are associated with higher CGI scores but lower market valuations, which suggests that formal governance mechanisms may be used to serve political objectives rather than maximizing firm value. We further find that ESG scores complement rather than substitute for traditional governance metrics in predicting firm value. Our findings demonstrate that governance effectiveness is institutionally embedded and reforms cannot be transplanted from developed markets without accounting for local institutional contexts.},
keywords = {Corporate governance, BRICS, firm value, Tobin’s Q, board independence, ownership concentration, ESG, state ownership, emerging markets},
month = {October},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.64388/IREV10I4-1723597}
}