The Role of Delegation of Authority and Approval Workflows in Strengthening Procurement Governance in Saudi Corporations

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@article{1724387,
      author = {Mohammad Tanzil},
      title = {The Role of Delegation of Authority and Approval Workflows in Strengthening Procurement Governance in Saudi Corporations},
      journal = {Iconic Research And Engineering Journals},
      year = {2026},
      volume = {10},
      number = {4},
      pages = {3719-3730},
      issn = {2456-8880},
      url = {https://www.irejournals.com/formatedpaper/1724387.pdf},
      abstract = {Procurement governance depends on how authority, information and accountability are connected when organizations make commitments to suppliers. A delegation matrix may identify approval limits while leaving the meaning of individual decisions, escalation conditions and evidence requirements unclear. This paper develops an integrative framework explaining how delegation of authority and approval workflows can support procurement governance in Saudi corporations. A targeted review combines organizational economics, purchasing research, contract governance, internal control and digital workflow literature with official governance sources. The synthesis identifies four mechanisms: matching decision rights with relevant knowledge, distinguishing different forms of procurement authorization, preserving evidence before commitments arise and reviewing exceptions through independent oversight. Three proposed matrices describe decision responsibilities, workflow risks and performance indicators. Two original diagrams illustrate conditional routing and the relationships requiring empirical validation. The analysis argues that additional approval layers do not necessarily strengthen control; their usefulness depends on decision purpose, reviewer capability and the treatment of nonstandard exposure. Contract approval, signing authority, service acceptance and payment release are treated as related but distinct decisions. The framework proposes a balance between timely delegation and proportionate challenge without prescribing universal monetary thresholds. No corporate audit, survey or causal performance estimate is reported. The contribution is an operational account of how formal authority can become informed and traceable procurement decision-making, subject to organizational and regulatory context.},
      keywords = {delegation of authority; approval workflows; procurement governance; decision rights; internal control; Saudi corporations},
      month = {October},
  }