One Person, One Vote vs. One State, One Voice: Rethinking Parliamentary Representation and Delimitation in India

1Introduction

The process of fixing or changing of boundaries of territorial constituencies in a country or a province having a legislative body is known as Delimitation. The task of delimitation is assigned to a high-power body, which is known as Delimitation Commission or a Boundary Commission. In India, such Delimitation Commissions have been constituted 4 times, in 1952 under the Delimitation Commission Act, 1952, in 1963 under Delimitation Commission Act, 1962, in 1973 under Delimitation Act, 1972 and in 2002 under Delimitation Act, 2002 (Election Commission of India, n.d.-a; Patel & Sekher, 2024, p. 4).

The Constitution provides that seats in Lok Sabha must be allocated to states in proportion to their population. The 42nd constitutional amendment in 1976 stated that, the total number of seats of each state in Lok Sabha and the total number of seats in State Assemblies was frozen based on the 1971 census. This freeze was initially applicable until the publication of the first census after 2000. The 84^th Constitutional Amendment in 2001 extended this freeze until the publication of the first census after 2026 (PRS Legislative Research, 2026). Since the most recent reapportionment of parliamentary seats between states in 1971, India’s population has surged by nearly 1 billion, yet its political map has remained unchanged (Tillin et al., 2026). In Lok Sabha on April 16, 2026, the government tried to finally tackle the still hanging question of delimitation through a trio of bills : (i) the Constitution (131^st Amendment) Bill, 2026, (ii) the Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026, and (iii) the Delimitation Bill, 2026 (PRS Legislative Research, 2026). All three of these bills aim to increase the no. of seats in Lok Sabha from 550 to 850 and tied with these is the reservation of women bill brought by the 106th Constitutional Amendment in 2023, which was said to be based on the first census after the commencement of the 2023 Act. The Union Territories (UTs) Laws Bill gives effect to similar provisions in cases of Puducherry, Delhi, and Jammu & Kashmir. All these changes leave the structure of Rajya Sabha relatively untouched.

The delimitation under a strict “one person, one vote” standard, and reallocating Lok Sabha seats in proportion to current population would shift representation sharply towards faster-growing, poorer northern states and critically reduce the relative influence of slower-growing, richer southern states (Tillin et al., 2026). This paper argues that India should neither allocate seats strictly by population nor freeze each state’s existing share indefinitely. Instead, it should adopt a hybrid model that gives priority to equal voting power while protecting states’ current share of seats, adding new seats according to population and demographic performance, so that no state is penalised for stabilising its population.

This paper examines the inter-state allocation of Lok Sabha seats after 2026, and does not cover boundary drawing within states or seat reservation. It uses a doctrinal and qualitative method, drawing on constitutional provisions, Election Commission of India materials and PRS analysis for facts, and on academic and policy scholarship for argument.

2Constitutional and historical framework of delimitation

The Constitution of India ties representation to a population based structure for Lok Sabha elections. Article 81 states that Lok Sabha seats are to be allotted so that the ratio of seats to population is the same for every state, and Article 170 applies the same principle to state legislative assemblies (Constitution of India, arts 81, 170). Article 82 notes that after each Census, the allocation of seats to the states and the division of each state into territorial constituencies are to be readjusted by an authority, in a manner determined by Parliament by law. This delimitation exercise is carried out by a Delimitation Commission, constituted under a Delimitation Act, whose orders have the force of law.

In the starting decades the system worked smoothly. Delimitation Commissions were constituted under the Acts of 1952, 1962 and 1972, following the Censuses of 1951, 1961 and 1971 (Election Commission of India, n.d.-a). But during the Emergency this process was halted. Indira Gandhi was concerned that population-based reapportionment would penalise states with lower fertility rates, and the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act 1976 was enacted (Tillin et al., 2026). The amendment froze the allocation of seats among states on the basis of the 1971 Census until the first Census after 2000 (Election Commission of India, n.d.-c).

As the deadline approached, inter-state reallocation was again postponed until the first Census after 2026, with the enactment of the Constitution (84th Amendment) Act 2001, while allowing constituencies within states to be readjusted on the basis of the 1991 Census (Election Commission of India, n.d.-c). The Constitution (87th Amendment) Act 2003 changed that basis to the 2001 Census, again without altering the number of seats held by each state (Election Commission of India, n.d.-c). The Delimitation Commission constituted under the Delimitation Act 2002 then redrew constituency boundaries and readjusted reserved seats on that basis (Delimitation Act 2002).

As a result, each state’s share of Lok Sabha seats still reflects the population of 1971, more than fifty years later. In April 2026, the Government introduced three linked Bills, as already mentioned before: the Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, the Delimitation Bill and the Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill. The first proposed expanding the Lok Sabha from 543 to 850 seats and carrying out delimitation on the 2011 Census, in order to implement women’s reservation sooner (PRS Legislative Research, 2026). The Lok Sabha defeated the constitutional amendment on 17 April 2026, falling short of the two-thirds majority required, and the other two Bills were withdrawn. The freeze therefore remains in place, and the question this paper addresses remains open.

3Literature review

The demographic growth of the Indian population has been uneven and the freeze blindly ignored it. Patel and Sekher (2024) argue that differences in fertility decline across states have created disparities in political representation, and they propose expanding the Lok Sabha to 793 seats using the Webster method to restore the link between seats and population. PRS Legislative Research (2026) raises a similar concern in its analysis of the 2026 Bills, noting that a reallocation on the latest Census could benefit Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan. Tillin et al. (2026) make the same point in more general terms, observing that a strict “one person, one vote” standard would favour faster-growing, poorer northern states.

A second line of thinkers question whether population alone should decide allocation. Mehrotra (2026) argues that a purely population-based formula is no longer adequate for preserving federal balance, because states have followed very different demographic paths. He proposes keeping the existing 550 seats and distributing any additional seats according to a demographic performance principle, and he extends the analysis to women’s representation. PRS Legislative Research (2026) supports the concern from the other side, identifying that southern states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala which focused keenly on their controlled population growth could lose relative representation.

The third strand frames the issue as a question of constitutional federalism. Mishra and Tiwari (2026) contend that allocating seats strictly by demographic weight does not violate the basic structure, but rather fulfills an essential constitutional mandate. They observe that the principal danger resides in the mode of implementation, including the selection of Census data, the pace of readjustment, and the dilution of federal guarantees. PRS Legislative Research (2026a) similarly highlights that the 2026 Bills leave the timing and mechanism of delimitation to ordinary parliamentary law, omitting explicit constitutional protection. Tillin et al. (2026) add a political dimension, arguing that the contest over representation and regional power has been delayed, not resolved. The Carnegie analysis is commentary, and this paper uses it as such.

Taken together, the literature develops each principle and offers competing seat formulas, but it tends to advance one principle or one model at a time. This paper evaluates the two principles against each other and tests whether a hybrid model can reconcile them.

4Theoretical framework

4.1“One person, one vote” and equal representation

The driving force of modern representative democracies is their population. But in a democracy without extensive engagement in terms of participation and representation, the vitality and legitimacy of public order is missing, which makes it problematic and the promise of a political life remains unfulfilled (Verba & Nie, 1987, as cited in Patel & Sekher, 2024) . Balinski and Young note that each vote carries an equal value, so a vote from a small state also carries the same weight as a vote from a large state (Balinski & Young, 2001, cited in Patel & Sekher, 2024, p. 2) .Even the Indian Constitution inculcates this principle through the Article 81 (2)(a), which requires that the ratio of seats to population have to be the same across states as far as practicable. However, let’s not bemuse the equal right to vote or equal suffrage to equal value of each vote, the malapportionment is failure of the latter. The principle of “One person, one vote” and equal representation takes the individual as the unit of representation, but a federation also treats states as units.

4.2Federalism and the state as a unit of representation

In a Federation other than the collection of individual voters, states also constitute singular units of representation. The Article 1 of the Indian Constitution declares India as a “Union of States”, making it even clear with the Upper House or the Rajya Sabha representing the states. This shows how the federal structure which is talked about on paper is also brought into practice.The main point being, a formula based only on the voter can shift power between regions in ways that affect the federal bargain. While Patel and Sekher (2024, p. 1) say the threat to federalism lies in disparities among states, Mehrotra (2026) also argues a purely population-based formula is no longer adequate for federal balance. The freeze itself recognised states’ population-stabilisation efforts, and Mehrotra grounds his demographic performance idea in the logic of the 84th Amendment. The 15th Finance Commission added a demographic performance criterion in tax devolution (Patel & Sekher, 2024, p. 2). These show the Constitution has never treated population as the only measure. Equal vote value protects the individual, while federal balance protects the states, and this paper asks which should have priority.

4.3Comparative models: The US Congress and Germany’s Bundesrat

Comparing these two democracies fulfills the purpose to show how other federations reconcile the two principles, and not to copy them.

1. 1. The US: two chambers, two principles. The House of Representatives is apportioned among states by population, while the Senate gives each state two seats regardless of size. This is the Great Compromise (Constitution, art I). The US Supreme Court later required near-equal district populations for the House in Wesberry v Sanders (1964), while the Senate stays outside that rule. Here the point to be noted is that the US keeps vote equality in one chamber and state equality in the other.
2. 2. Germany:In the Bundesrat, the state governments (Länder) cast votes weighted by population but with a compressed range, between three and six votes per state under Article 51 of the Basic Law. Larger states get more votes, but not in proportion to their size. This sits between pure equality and pure proportionality.

Comparative federations show different ways of reconciling individual and state representation. In the United States, the House of Representatives is apportioned among the states by population, while the Senate gives each state two seats regardless of size, so equal vote value and equal state status are each secured in a separate chamber (US Constitution, art I; Wesberry v Sanders 376 US 1 (1964)). In Germany, the Länder cast weighted votes in the Bundesrat, with larger states receiving more votes but not in proportion to their populations (Basic Law, art 51). The Rajya Sabha, by contrast, allocates seats among states broadly by population, which limits its power to offset shifts in the Lok Sabha. These models are used here to illustrate possible designs, not as templates for India.

5The case for population-based equality

5.1Democratic equality and the value of the vote

The case for population-based allocation begins with the claim that a vote should carry the same weight wherever it is cast. Article 81 requires, as far as practicable, the same ratio of seats to population in every state, and the freeze has steadily eroded that ratio (Patel & Sekher, 2024, pp. 2, 6). The last delimitation left us with 1.04 million people being represented by a single seat in the major states. An MP now represents about 2.2 million, and the figure is projected to reach 2.7 million by 2031 (Patel & Sekher, 2024, p. 6). Larger constituencies also strain responsiveness, since each member must serve many more people.

5.2Malapportionment and the high-growth states

The distortion falls unevenly. India’s population grew from 548 million in 1971 to 1.21 billion in 2011 (Patel & Sekher, 2024, p. 4), but growth differed sharply across states: Bihar’s population has risen by about 215 per cent since 1971, against about 70 per cent in Kerala (Patel & Sekher, 2024). Rajasthan by 2026, is projected to have 1 MP per 3.4 million people and Bihar 3.3 million (Patel & Sekher, 2024, p. 5). In 2024, Bangalore North in Karnataka had 3.2 million electors, against 1.2 million in Kerala’s Idukki (Patel & Sekher, 2024, p. 6). This gives us a clear picture that voters in high-growth states are therefore under-represented, and those in slow-growth states over-represented.

The process of reallocating the existing 543 seats on projected 2026 populations would give Uttar Pradesh 11 more seats, Bihar 9, Rajasthan 6 and Madhya Pradesh 5, while low-growth states such as Tamil Nadu and Kerala would lose 10 and 6, respectively. Four northern states would gain 31 seats and five southern states would lose 26 (Patel & Sekher, 2024, p. 8). PRS Legislative Research (2026a) identifies the same direction of change, and Tillin et al. (2026) describe it as the likely result of a strict “one person, one vote” standard.

5.3Expansion and the Webster method

The solution to this problem, as given by Patel and Sekher, is to enlarge the house instead of taking away seats from anyone. Webster method, a standard apportionment formula described by the authors as impartial (Balinski & Young, 2001, as cited in Patel & Sekher, 2024), allocates seats in proportion to population. Setting the divisor by Kerala’s population per seat, so that no state loses a seat, they project a Lok Sabha of 793 seats in 2026 and 811 in 2031, with Uttar Pradesh at 134 and Bihar at 73 (Patel & Sekher, 2024, pp. 8, 10–11). Their argument is that it is politically easier to expand the house than to redistribute the existing ones, and that 543 seats is small for a population of 1.4 billion when Germany allots 736 to 83 million people (p. 8). A version using only the population aged 18 and over yields 738 seats (p. 11). Other estimates for 2026 include 718 and 848 (Vaishnav & Hintson, 2019, as cited in Patel & Sekher, 2024, p. 8).

5.4Limitations of this position

There are four loopholes to this case. First, even the expansion model does not provide the kind of population equality it talks about, because its rule that no state loses seats is itself a federal safeguard. Second, it does not remove the shift in relative power: the four northern states would gain 129 seats against 23 for the five southern states, a gap the authors admit may worry the south (p. 11). Third, a large expansion is politically very difficult to achieve. The Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, which proposed enlarging the Lok Sabha to 850 seats, was defeated in April 2026 (PRS Legislative Research, 2026b). Fourth, a population-only rule ignores demographic performance. Mehrotra (2026) argues that states which stabilised their populations earlier risk losing influence for following national policy, and that a purely population-based formula is therefore no longer adequate for preserving federal balance.

6The case for preserving federal balance

6.1Federalism and the basic structure

The case for preserving federal balance starts from the view that the state is itself a unit of representation, and that a federation cannot treat its members as mere pools of voters. Keeping in mind that India is a Union of states, the central question here arises, whether population-driven delimitation could threaten the basic structure of Indian federalism? Federalism has been treated as part of that structure in many orders of the Supreme Court, which gives the argument constitutional weight beyond policy preference. Mehrotra (2026) makes the related point that a purely population-based allocation formula is no longer adequate for preserving federal balance, because states have followed very different demographic paths.

6.2Penalising demographic success

The freeze itself was built on this concern. Indira Gandhi’s government feared that population-based reapportionment would penalise states with lower fertility rates (Tillin et al., 2026), and the 42nd and 84th Amendments extended the freeze in the context of population stabilisation policy (Patel & Sekher, 2024, p. 4). According to the authors the Southern states have controlled their population through extensive family planning programs, therefore strict reliance on demographic criteria would gravely disadvantage them. Mehrotra (2026) grounds his proposal in the logic of the 84th Amendment, which recognised states’ population stabilisation efforts. Southern states also point to their economic performance, low fertility and high levels of women’s education and empowerment, and argue that these achievements would translate into a loss of influence (Patel & Sekher, 2024, p. 13). This population only rule would create a reverse reward system, rewarding the states that followed the national policy the least and create a perverse incentive for future policy.

6.3Political and fiscal consequences

Under Patel and Sekher’s projection for 2026 the effects would be economic and political, five southern states would lose 26 seats on a fixed house of 543, and Tamil Nadu alone would lose 10 (2024, p. 8). PRS Legislative Research (2026a) flags the same losses for Tamil Nadu and Kerala, and the possible implications for the Rajya Sabha and federal balance. The fiscal parallel is already visible. The 15th Finance Commission lowered the population weight in tax devolution from 17.5 per cent (1971 Census) to 15 per cent (2011 Census) and added a 12.5 per cent demographic performance criterion, which prompted southern concerns about their share of revenue (Patel & Sekher, 2024, p. 2). A loss of seats would weaken the same states’ voice in the bodies that decide such questions. Tillin et al. (2026) argue that the contest over representation and regional power has been delayed, not resolved, and that it will shape India’s federal balance.

6.4Drawbacks

This case also has weaknesses. First, an indefinite freeze cannot be defended on principle. Patel and Sekher (2024, p. 13) call it a temporary way of creating an artificial sense of stability while distorting democratic principles further, and many others say an open-ended freeze is fatal to democracy. Mehrotra (2026), who defends federal balance, accepts population as the dominant basis of representation. Second, the freeze protects states that are now over-represented, and the cost falls on the poorer, faster-growing states, whose voters carry the heavier load (Patel & Sekher, 2024, p. 5). Third, a fixed share of seats does not respond to the reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which would drift away from these groups’ real population shares (p. 11). Fourth, fertility decline reflects development, education and income as well as policy, so it is difficult to say how much of the decline deserves to be rewarded. These limits suggest the defence of federal balance is strongest as a safeguard within a population-based system, and not as a reason to keep the freeze.

7Critical analysis: Reconciling the two principles

7.1Weighing the two positions

The two principles are more aligned than the debate suggests. The strongest population-equality proposal already contains a federal safeguard: Patel and Sekher (2024, pp. 8–11) set the divisor so that no state loses a seat. The leading federal-balance model primarily uses population to determine representation (Mehrotra, 2026), and many others reject both excessive proportionality and an open ended freeze. The real disagreement is narrower, whether existing seat shares should be protected, and how the new seats should be distributed. On that question, the two positions differ in what they treat as the default. Equal vote value is a rule that applies to every citizen, while the protection of states is an exception that needs a justification. The justification exists, because the freeze was meant to avoid penalising states for following national population policy (Tillin et al., 2026), but it supports a limit on the rule, not its abandonment. This paper therefore treats equal vote value as the governing principle and federal balance as a constraint on how it is applied.

7.2The role of the Rajya Sabha

The federal burden can be incurred by the Rajya Sabha in principle, but it currently does so only weakly. In the United States, equal state representation in the Senate balances the population based House. The seats in Rajya Sabha are divided broadly based on population, thus, it has a negligible impact on balancing the shift in the Lok Sabha. Patel and Sekher (2024, p. 11) suggest adjusting Lok Sabha seats to the latest Census while leaving each state’s Rajya Sabha seats unchanged, which would leave the upper house as a partial counterweight, though they note the option has its own limits. PRS Legislative Research (2026a) raises the implications of delimitation for the Rajya Sabha and the federal balance. The Rajya Sabha is therefore best seen as a supporting safeguard, which can soften the effect of reallocation but cannot replace a fair rule for the Lok Sabha.

7.3Women’s representation and the size of the house

There is another issue, which is being linked to the increasing seats of Lok Sabha. The Women’s Reservation Act of 2023 sets aside one-third of seats, but the quota takes effect only after delimitation (Patel & Sekher, 2024, p. 13). Every delay in settling seat allocation therefore delays reservation too, and the 2026 Bills all tied to this (PRS Legislative Research, 2026b). Expansion also makes the trade-off easier to manage. A larger house can add seats for the high-growth states without removing any from the south, and it can accommodate the reserved seats without forcing existing members out. Mehrotra (2026) adds to this, proposing that additional seats be allocated by demographic performance and that a hybrid first-past-the-post and proportional representation system could be used to implement women’s reservation. Expansion has costs, including the question of how large a house is workable, but it is the only option that serves all three aims at once.

7.4Political feasibility and national cohesion

The ground reality is tested in terms of feasibility. The Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill was defeated in the Lok Sabha in April 2026, when it fell short of the two-thirds majority it needed (PRS Legislative Research, 2026b). The result shows that no formula will pass without broad agreement, whatever its merits, and that changing the representation of states in Parliament is likely to need ratification by the states as well (Constitution of India, art 368). Tillin et al. (2026) argue that the contest has been delayed, not settled. Many others conclude that reform should be gradual and begin with wide consultation with the states. National cohesion is at stake, a reallocation that leaves southern states feeling penalised, or a freeze that leaves northern voters feeling discounted, would each deepen a regional divide that Patel and Sekher (2024, p. 1) already identify as the main threat to federalism. A hybrid solution is therefore justified on grounds of principle and of practical politics.

8Proposed way forward

This paper recommends a hybrid model in which equal vote value governs the allocation of seats and federal balance limits how it is applied. The model has three parts. First, the Lok Sabha should be enlarged instead of seats being taken from any state. Patel and Sekher (2024) show that expansion allows population to be reflected without reducing any state’s current number of seats, and many others propose a constitutional floor with the same effect. Second, the existing 543 seats should be retained as each state’s protected base, and the additional seats should be distributed by a formula combining population with demographic performance, following Mehrotra (2026), who derives the principle from the core principle of the 84th Amendment. Patel and Sekher (2024, p. 13) point to the 15th Finance Commission as a precedent for weighting demographic and socio-economic parameters, so the idea is not new to Indian public policy. Third, Parliament should set the exact weights in the open and review them after each Census, so that the floor remains a transitional protection and does not become a permanent freeze under another name. The exact weights are a political choice that this paper does not fix.

The model needs safeguards. The floor protects every state’s existing share, and Patel and Sekher (2024, p. 11) suggest that Rajya Sabha seats could stay unchanged while Lok Sabha seats follow the latest Census, preserving a counterweight in the upper house. Because the change would alter the representation of states in Parliament, it should be settled by consultation with the states, which Patel and Sekher (2024, p. 13) recommend, and by the constitutional amendment procedure.

Except for the formula, procedure also matters. The 2026 Bills would leave the choice of Census and the timing of delimitation to Parliament by ordinary law, which PRS Legislative Research (2026a) identifies as a source of uncertainty and a potential advantage to the government of the day. Instead the Constitution should fix the periodicity and the Census basis. The Delimitation Commission should be independent, with its composition set out in law, and it should publish its draft proposals and any dissent, as the Delimitation Bill itself envisaged (PRS Legislative Research, 2026c). Transparency is especially important because Tillin et al. (2026) note credible allegations of gerrymandering in recent cases. Finally, delimitation and women’s reservation should be sequenced together, since reservation takes effect only after delimitation. Mehrotra (2026) suggests that a hybrid electoral mechanism could help, but that proposal needs separate study.

9Conclusion

This paper evaluates whether post-2026 delimitation should reapportion Lok Sabha seats strictly according to current demographic figures or freeze each state’s quota indefinitely. It contends that neither pure approach remains viable on its own. While the principle of equal suffrage requires that every vote carry equivalent weight, federal considerations must constrain the implementation of that rule.

Three considerations support this conclusion. First, the freeze introduced in 1976 and prolonged in 2001 to safeguard demographic success has progressively exacerbated malapportionment. Currently, an MP represents approximately double the population compared to earlier decades, with the resulting imbalance weighing most heavily on rapidly expanding northern states. Second, enforcing a rigid population-based formula would penalize jurisdictions that successfully implemented family planning, thereby undermining the federal understanding that treats each state as a distinct unit of representation. Third, each side’s strongest proposal already concedes something to the other. The expansion model protects every state’s current seats, and the demographic performance model accepts population as the dominant basis of representation.

The proposed hybrid framework builds upon this realignment by expanding Lok Sabha representation while establishing the current 543-seat baseline as a constitutional floor. Additional seats are subsequently allocated through a population-based formula adjusted for demographic performance, administered via a transparent process that undergoes periodic review following each decennial Census. Ultimately, the legislative defeat of the 2026 Bills underscores that achieving systemic political consensus remains as essential as formulating a sound policy design.

Certain methodological limitations must be acknowledged. This analysis relies upon published demographic projections rather than enumeration data from a newly completed Census, and it refrains from prescribing fixed numerical weights for the allocation formula. Future scholarly inquiry should evaluate this framework against upcoming Census findings, examine its operational integration with gender quotas under women’s reservation, and conduct a more rigorous comparative assessment of parallel federal systems.

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