Secure and Unified AI – Blockchain Voting System with Real Time Verification

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@article{1714243,
      author = {J. Indra Sibi, B. Shanmuga Sundari, M. Elza Melif},
      title = {Secure and Unified AI – Blockchain Voting System with Real Time Verification},
      journal = {Iconic Research And Engineering Journals},
      year = {2026},
      volume = {9},
      number = {8},
      pages = {854-867},
      issn = {2456-8880},
      url = {https://www.irejournals.com/formatedpaper/1714243.pdf},
      abstract = {Online voting for independent elections is generally supported by trusted election providers. Typically these providers do not offer any way in which a voter can verify their vote, and hence the providers are trusted with ballot privacy and in ensuring correctness. Despite the desire to offer online voting for political elections, this lack of transparency and verifiability is often seen as a significant barrier to the large-scale adoption of online elections. Adding verifiability to an online election increases transparency and integrity, as well as allowing voters to verify that the vote they cast has been recorded correctly and included in the tally. However, replacing existing online systems with those that provide verifiable voting requires new algorithms and code to be deployed, and this presents a significant business risk to commercial election providers, as well as the societal risk for official elections selecting for public office. In this paper we present the first step in an incremental approach which minimizes the business risk but demonstrates the advantages of verifiability, by developing an implementation of key elements of a Selene-based verifiability layer and adding it to an operational online voting system. Selene is a verifiable voting protocol that publishes votes in plain text alongside a voter’s tracker. These trackers enable voters to confirm that their votes have been captured correctly by the system, such that the election provider does not know which tracker has been allocated to which voter. This results in a system where even a “dishonest but cautious” election authority running the system cannot be sure of changing the result in an undetectable way, and hence gives stronger guarantees on the integrity of the election than were previously present. We explore the challenges presented by adding a verifiability layer to an operational system. The system was used in two initial trials conducted within real contested elections. We conclude by outlining the further steps in the road-map towards the deployment of a fully trustworthy online voting system.},
      month = {February},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.64388/IREV9I8-1714243}
  }