Technology, Governance, And The Prevention of Rural Banditry: Examining The Early Warning Framework in Southern Kaduna, Nigeria

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@article{1722565,
      author = {Josiah David Hassan Jr.},
      title = {Technology, Governance, And The Prevention of Rural Banditry: Examining The Early Warning Framework in Southern Kaduna, Nigeria},
      journal = {Iconic Research And Engineering Journals},
      year = {2026},
      volume = {10},
      number = {2},
      pages = {2798-2810},
      issn = {2456-8880},
      url = {https://www.irejournals.com/formatedpaper/1722565.pdf},
      abstract = {Rural banditry in Middle-Belt Nigeria has gradually evolved into a persistent form of organized armed violence that resists purely military containment. Southern Kaduna, long shaped by communal contestation and uneven state presence, offers a revealing site for examining the limits of reactive security strategies. This article addresses a central problem: despite the proliferation of technology-driven early warning systems (EWS), persistent institutional fragmentation undermines their effectiveness in preventing violence. The core research question is: Can digital early warning platforms genuinely alter the dynamics of rural armed violence in contexts marked by weak governance coherence? To answer this, the study draws on fragile-state scholarship, security sector reform debates, and digital governance theory, and explicitly develops and applies a Technology–Governance–Prevention Framework as its theoretical foundation. Using a qualitative case-study design and data triangulation (ACLED; the Council on Foreign Relations' Nigeria Security Tracker, hereafter CFR; and documentary sources), the analysis demonstrates that digital platforms alone are insufficient. Without institutional responsiveness and coordinated authority structures, such systems become largely symbolic. The article’s main finding is that governance coherence, not technological sophistication, is the decisive factor in early warning effectiveness.},
      keywords = {early warning systems; fragile states; security governance; digital monitoring},
      month = {August},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.64388/IREV10I2-1722565}
  }