Quota Compliance in The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: The Role of Trigger Strategies and Discount Factors

• Author(s): Geoffrey Nyasimi ; Dr. Yasin Kuso Ghabon
• Paper ID: 1708703
• Page: 1644-1649
• Published Date: 26-05-2025
• Published In: Iconic Research And Engineering Journals
• Publisher: IRE Journals
• e-ISSN: 2456-8880
• Volume/Issue: Volume 8 Issue 11 May-2025

Abstract

This paper examines quota adherence among the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) using the lens of repeated game theory, particularly the repeated prisoner's dilemma. OPEC's collective efforts to manage oil production face challenges as individual members have incentives to defect for short-term gains. This study analyzes how trigger strategies and discount factors influence compliance behavior. It finds that credible punishment mechanisms and sufficiently high discount factors are key to sustaining cooperation. Both theoretical insights and empirical observations are integrated to assess the strategic behavior of OPEC member states.

Keywords

Collusion, Discount factor, Game theory, OPEC, Quota compliance, Repeated games, Trigger strategies.

Citations

IRE Journals:
Geoffrey Nyasimi , Dr. Yasin Kuso Ghabon "Quota Compliance in The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: The Role of Trigger Strategies and Discount Factors" Iconic Research And Engineering Journals Volume 8 Issue 11 2025 Page 1644-1649

IEEE:
Geoffrey Nyasimi , Dr. Yasin Kuso Ghabon "Quota Compliance in The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: The Role of Trigger Strategies and Discount Factors" Iconic Research And Engineering Journals, 8(11)