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Smuggling Strategies in Developing Countries: Dissecting the Two-Person Game
Subject area: Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities · Area of research: International Relations, Comparative Politics
Abstract
This paper examines the complex interactions between smugglers and state security agencies in developing counties through the prism of game theoretical model. The study employ the two-person zero-sum and non-zero sum game to examine situations of conflict and consensus between smugglers and security agents in borderlands. In zero-sum game, the paper identify that smugglers employ the use of route diversification, concealment and speed and timing strategies to achieve their goals. In contest, border security agents employ strategies such as becoming unpredictable, cut-setting targets, use of advance modelling and deception as counter strategies against smugglers which leads to seizure of goods, arrest of smugglers and creating conditions that make it difficult for them to operate. However, despite the security agencies counter-smuggling efforts, the study further finds out that security agents do collaborate with smugglers to facilitate smuggling (two-person non-sum game). The study identify some of the several strategies used by the duo to achieve their goals. This include but not limited to official route collusion, tacit cooperation, institutional co-optation and signalling and coordination. The study concluded that while smugglers constitute threat to the socio-economic and political well-being of developing nations, their success was a product of the partial contributions of border security agencies.
Keywords
smugglers, security agents, developing countries, strategies
References
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How to cite this paper
@article{1710396,
author = {Abubakar Liman PhD },
title = {Smuggling Strategies in Developing Countries: Dissecting the Two-Person Game},
journal = {Iconic Research And Engineering Journals},
year = {2025},
volume = {9},
number = {3},
pages = {91-100},
issn = {2456-8880},
url = {https://www.irejournals.com/formatedpaper/1710396.pdf},
abstract = {This paper examines the complex interactions between smugglers and state security agencies in developing counties through the prism of game theoretical model. The study employ the two-person zero-sum and non-zero sum game to examine situations of conflict and consensus between smugglers and security agents in borderlands. In zero-sum game, the paper identify that smugglers employ the use of route diversification, concealment and speed and timing strategies to achieve their goals. In contest, border security agents employ strategies such as becoming unpredictable, cut-setting targets, use of advance modelling and deception as counter strategies against smugglers which leads to seizure of goods, arrest of smugglers and creating conditions that make it difficult for them to operate. However, despite the security agencies counter-smuggling efforts, the study further finds out that security agents do collaborate with smugglers to facilitate smuggling (two-person non-sum game). The study identify some of the several strategies used by the duo to achieve their goals. This include but not limited to official route collusion, tacit cooperation, institutional co-optation and signalling and coordination. The study concluded that while smugglers constitute threat to the socio-economic and political well-being of developing nations, their success was a product of the partial contributions of border security agencies.},
keywords = {smugglers, security agents, developing countries, strategies},
month = {September},
}