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Competition Law Enforcement in India (2020–2025): An Empirical Analysis of Institutional Efficacy, Procedural Delays, and the Impact of the 2023 Amendment Act
Subject area: Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities · Area of research: Law
DOI: https://doi.org/10.64388/IREV9I8-1714282
Abstract
The enforcement of competition law in India has experienced a massive institutional and legislative change between the periods 2020-2025. The paper presents an in-depth empirical and doctrinal evaluation of the performance of the Competition Commission of India in enforcing the law with respect to the institutions efficacy, adjudication delays, and early effects of the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023. The research design is a mixed method, as it analyses 217 final orders of Competition Commission of India, which involved anti-competitive agreement and abuse of dominance, data concerning merger control, and 42 appellate decisions of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. The quantitative methods, such as survival analysis and multivariate regression, are used to compare the investigation time and delay predictors, and the qualitative doctrinal analysis is used to determine how judicial acceptance of the 2023 amendments. The results indicate the existence of long-term systemic delays, the median investigation timelines are several times longer than required by law, slight changes in the rates of imposing sentences after the amendments, and little use of new settlement and commitment mechanisms. Although reforms in merger control have brought some efficiency improvements, enforcement performance remains characterized with institutional capacity limitation and compliance shortage. The research provides the first-of-its-type empirical data to the literature on antitrust enforcement in the emerging economies and provides policy relevant issues to enhance the competition governance in India.
Keywords
Competition Commission of India; Procedural Delay; Competition (Amendment) Act 2023; Institutional Efficacy; Merger Control
References
[1] Bhattacharjea, A. (2010). The case for competition law in India. Economic and Political Weekly, 45(26–27), 45–52.
[2] Competition Commission of India. (2020). Annual report 2019–2020. Government of India.
[3] Competition Commission of India. (2021). Annual report 2020–2021. Government of India.
[4] Competition Commission of India. (2022). Annual report 2021–2022. Government of India.
[5] Competition Commission of India. (2023). Annual report 2022–2023. Government of India.
[6] Competition Commission of India. (2024). Annual report 2023–2024. Government of India.
[7] CUTS International. (2023). Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023: Policy implications. CUTS Policy Brief.
[8] Fox, E. M., & Bakhoum, M. (2019). Making markets work for Africa. Oxford University Press.
[9] Khan, L. M., & Vaheesan, S. (2017). Market power and inequality. Antitrust Law Journal, 83(1), 1–28.
[10] Mehta, P. S. (2021). Competition law enforcement in India. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 9(2), 356–378.
[11] Sengupta, A., & Sharma, A. (2018). Enforcement trends under the Competition Act. World Competition, 41(4), 615–642.
[12] Supreme Court of India. (2019). Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2019) 5 SCC 1.
[13] National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. (2020–2024). Selected competition law decisions.
How to cite this paper
@article{1714282,
author = {Mariya Joseph, N. Sudalai Muthu},
title = {Competition Law Enforcement in India (2020–2025): An Empirical Analysis of Institutional Efficacy, Procedural Delays, and the Impact of the 2023 Amendment Act},
journal = {Iconic Research And Engineering Journals},
year = {2026},
volume = {9},
number = {8},
pages = {931-938},
issn = {2456-8880},
url = {https://www.irejournals.com/formatedpaper/1714282.pdf},
abstract = {The enforcement of competition law in India has experienced a massive institutional and legislative change between the periods 2020-2025. The paper presents an in-depth empirical and doctrinal evaluation of the performance of the Competition Commission of India in enforcing the law with respect to the institutions efficacy, adjudication delays, and early effects of the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023. The research design is a mixed method, as it analyses 217 final orders of Competition Commission of India, which involved anti-competitive agreement and abuse of dominance, data concerning merger control, and 42 appellate decisions of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. The quantitative methods, such as survival analysis and multivariate regression, are used to compare the investigation time and delay predictors, and the qualitative doctrinal analysis is used to determine how judicial acceptance of the 2023 amendments. The results indicate the existence of long-term systemic delays, the median investigation timelines are several times longer than required by law, slight changes in the rates of imposing sentences after the amendments, and little use of new settlement and commitment mechanisms. Although reforms in merger control have brought some efficiency improvements, enforcement performance remains characterized with institutional capacity limitation and compliance shortage. The research provides the first-of-its-type empirical data to the literature on antitrust enforcement in the emerging economies and provides policy relevant issues to enhance the competition governance in India.},
keywords = {Competition Commission of India; Procedural Delay; Competition (Amendment) Act 2023; Institutional Efficacy; Merger Control},
month = {February},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.64388/IREV9I8-1714282}
}